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ABSTRACT
What Happens When Cross-Sector Partnerships Are Mandated? Analyzing Trust through a
Transaction Cost Approach

Vanessa Hubbard Rastberger
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2020
Chair: Niraj Verma, Ph.D.
Professor of Public Policy and Urban Planning
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

Cross-sector partnerships that combine the perspectives and needs of public, private, and
nonprofit sectors have been used to address public policy challenges. Research has shown that
trust and reputation among partners play an important role in the performance of partnerships.
Trust has been positively associated with the reduction of transaction costs of partnerships, and
therefore, this study used a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach as the theoretical
framework.
Some partnerships are volitional while others are the results of legal or other mandates.
Does this volitional or non-volitional (mandated) status affect how collaboration is perceived?
For instance, will collaboration and trust be more likely to be positively perceived when partners
are mandated or when they are volitional? And how does this perceived collaboration affect
transaction costs and ultimately, the success of these partnerships? To answer these questions,
this study used a non-experimental, quantitative research design. Its findings are consistent with
the literature on the importance of trust and collaboration. The results confirmed that the
perception of collaboration differs when partnerships have mandated partners and when the
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partnership has volitional or non-mandated partners. Contrary to the literature, mandated
partners had a slightly stronger perception of collaboration than non-mandated ones, something
that was traced to the sectoral origins of the partners. This underscored the importance of
analyzing partnerships by sectors rather than just as an aggregate.
Further disaggregation was obtained by dissecting collaboration into components. All
four components derived from the study: (1) “Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership
Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy;” and (4) “Partnership Momentum” were
perceived differently in cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners and,
except for “Partnership Legitimacy,” non-mandated partners perceived collaboration more
strongly.
Overall, the results of the study confirmed some aspects of the literature, particularly the
salience of trust in reducing transaction costs and furthering collaboration. At the same time, the
results extend the literature by introducing two broad considerations: (a) sectoral origin or
allegiance of participants and (b) whether they were mandated to participate. As well, by
dissecting collaboration into constituent parts, the study advances the literature by showing how
the perception of capacity, responsiveness, legitimacy and momentum can affect collaboration in
partnerships.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Study
1.1 - Introduction
In today’s economy, a well-educated and highly skilled workforce is the cornerstone of
economic vitality and global competitiveness. Education and training are key components for a
thriving economy and social wellbeing. A mismatch of education and training leads to a shortage
of talent prepared to meet current and future workforce needs. Cross-sector partnerships that
combine the perspectives and needs of public, private, and nonprofit sectors have been used to
address the workforce skills gaps and the mismatch of talent supply and demand (Bryson,
Crosby, & Stone, 2006). While some partnerships are volitional, others are mandated and
dictate what partners must participate. (Selsky & Parker, 2005). The literature on these
partnerships puts trust between participants representing the sectors as crucial to ensuring the
success of the partnership (Nooteboom, 2007). Yet, much less is known about the relationships
between partners and particularly, the level of trust between them, when the partnerships are
mandated as opposed to when they are volitional.
The importance of trust increases as the problems become more complex, straddle
sectors, and the knowledge to resolve them rapidly changes. Workforce development, for
instance, is replete with these challenges because rapidly changing technological knowledge
implies equally rapid training, reformulation, and retraining along with the changing roles of
those in different sectors. Cybersecurity may have once come under the broad purview of
“security” and hence the preserve of government. There is little doubt that today, it is the shared
responsibility of the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Similarly, in the manufacturing
industry, the responsibility to replace an aging workforce by changing negative perceptions of
manufacturing among younger generations and their parents is shared by all sectors. This
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responsibility ranges from corporate social responsibility to mission-oriented nonprofits and
public sector obligations to educate our workforce in order to maintain a vibrant and competitive
economy.
Developing public policy in such situations is particularly tricky. It is widely known that
the knowledge needed to solve these, and similar problems, extend across sectors. But it is one
thing to declare the importance of partnerships across sectors and quite another to make these
partnerships sustainable. In many cases, such partnerships have become part of the regulatory
environment. They are mandated and must happen. However, mandated cooperation comes
with its own difficulties and is susceptible to the charge of tokenism rather than genuine
collaboration. Trust between sectors and between those representing them has been noted as a
particularly vulnerable area that could render these collaborations ineffective (Nooteboom,
Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997). As a result, despite the significant amount of federal, state and
local funding pouring into workforce cross-sector partnerships, lack of effective collaboration
leads these partnerships to fail to achieve their desired outcomes (Rubin & Stankiewicz, 2001;
Takahashi & Smutny, 2002).

1.2 - Background
Since the 1980s, public policymakers in the United States have advocated for
collaboration through partnerships. Partnerships are promoted as a solution to efficiency and
effectiveness among multiple organizations and sectors. For instance, Waddock (1988) describes
partnerships as multiple organizations involving a commitment of resources, both time and
effort, where organizations are solving problems that affect them all. These partnerships address
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issues that extend beyond organizational and sector boundaries and transcend to more broad
concerns of public policy (Waddock, 1998).
Partnerships can be very complex in their implementation, often failing to return intended
outcomes. Indeed, partnerships are sometimes called “fringe activities” because they are risky,
can be difficult to negotiate, political, and challenged by the institutional status quo (Bruffee,
1999). Partnerships are iterative and cyclical (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham, 2003), and are
hard to explain (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Gazeley, 2008; Linder, 1999). Other challenges to the
establishment and sustainability of cross-sector partnerships are the differing institutional
formalities like policies and values (Verma, 2007). These policies and values can conflict with
one another, thus, challenging the partnership at its core. Austin (2000) further adds that
collaboration from within-sectors is different from collaboration between sectors as there is
diversity of institutional cultures, performance measures, ways of communicating, motivations,
decision-making styles, and personal skills.
Specifically, the United States’ public workforce system is strategically driven by state
and regional workforce partnerships in the form of a state board and regional boards that are
cross-sectoral in nature and that consist primarily of private, public and community based
nonprofit organizations. They are mandatory partnerships with some requirements for mandated
partners to participate and are regulated under the federal legislation of the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) that was enacted in 2014. WIOA was designed to align
the public workforce system with education and economic development and is led by regional
leaders on a Workforce Development Board (WDB). (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity
Act, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, 2014). WIOA seeks
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to improve talent supply and demand by putting job seekers back to work and meeting the talent
demands of businesses.
WIOA reformed the public workforce system from the previous workforce legislation,
the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), and put more expectations on the WDBs to be
more strategic conveners of workforce system partners and stakeholders. Federal, state and local
funding dollars are funneled to these regional workforce partnerships with the purpose of giving
strategic direction for local workforce services.

1.3 - Purpose of the Study
Successful partnerships are those that are based on collaboration where partners exchange
resources, talent and skills to develop innovative solutions (Mendel & Brundney, 2012). Yet, there
has been little research about linkages between how the private, public and nonprofit sectors
partner together. Studies on collaborative relationships between multiple sectors is limited and
often occurs between same sectors, such as, nonprofit-public, public-private or nonprofit-private
sectors only. What has been missing by scholars is the inclusive perspective of cross-sector
partnerships and their often tri-party nature in the United States (Mendel & Brundney, 2012).
The theoretical framework of this study is built around a Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) approach. The application of TCE theory to mandated and non-mandated partners in
cross-sector partnerships has not been adequately explored. This study sought to evaluate how
collaboration in cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners affect
transaction costs. This is particularly important as cross-sector partnerships tend to create and
enforce silos because of the inherent differences of partners. Partners’ perception of trust and
collaboration is important because partnership success has been linked to partners’ perceived
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belief that the benefits of collaboration will outweigh the costs (Lubell, Schneider, & Mete,
2002).
Research has shown that trust and reputation among partners play an important role in the
performance of partnerships (Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2007; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, &
Soutter, 2000; Nooteboom, Berger, & Norrderhaven, 1997; Getha-Taylor, 2012; Dietz & Hartog,
2006; Judge & Dooley, 2006; Nooteboom, 2007). Additionally, trust has been positively
associated with reducing transaction costs (Gulati, 1998). Higher levels of trust are associated
with lower levels of governance costs (Gulati, 1998). Therefore, higher levels of trust reduce the
transaction costs that occur between partners in partnerships, such as the costs of monitoring the
partnership’s intended agreements. (Nooteboom, 1999). Nooteboom (1999) argues that a
reduction of transaction costs will lead to increased partnership success.
The purpose of this study is to determine the perception of collaboration and trust in
cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners in order to better understand
how collaboration affects transaction costs and ultimately, the success of these partnerships.

1.4 - Theoretical Framework Overview
Part of the "New Institutional Economics” paradigm, TCE builds on traditional
neoclassical economics by showing the importance and saliency of transaction costs (Judge &
Dooley, 2006). For neoclassical economists, the costs of running an economic system are only
for production and in a zero-transaction cost world (Coase, 1937). TCE theory was first
developed by Ronald Coase (1937) and further matured and operationalized by Oliver
Williamson in 1975 (Coase, 1992, Williamson, 1991).
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TCE was a major revision of neoclassical economics and distinguishes itself by
introducing the possibility of the influence of characteristics associated with the efficiency of a
chosen form of organization, outside of the free market and by recognizing potential hidden costs
(transaction costs) of future actions. Transaction costs are in contrast to production costs and are
the costs of running the economic system, or the economic equivalent of friction in physics
(Coase, 1937). Transactions must be exchanged, governed and organized, therefore, TCE
encourages the formation of the most efficient governance structure to minimize transaction
costs. (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). In TCE, the cost of transactions in one governance structure
is compared with another.
Coase’s explanation led to a paradigm shift in economics. Coase argued that the mode of
governance and level of organizational hierarchy chosen by an organization could be explained
through an evaluation of the transaction costs the organization would face under different kinds
of governance (Coase, 1937). Oliver Williamson (1975) extended Coase’s theory about the role
of transaction costs in determining whether organizations prefer market-based or hierarchical
forms of governance and formalized TCE as a foundational theory in organizational behavior
and, especially, governance.
TCE has become a powerful theory because it incorporates what was failed to be
considered in neoclassical economics, the concepts of bounded rationality, uncertainty, asset
specificity and opportunism behavior (Williamson, 1975). A principal message of TCE is that
the existence of change within institutions can be explained through transaction-costeconomizing behaviors (Williamson, 1985). Since transaction costs are not directly measured
but, rather, estimated using dimensions of given transactions as proxies, TCE was used as a lens
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in this study to determine how collaboration may affect transaction costs in cross-sector
partnerships that include mandated and non-mandated partners.

1.5 - Research Questions
Because of the influence collaboration can have on transition costs and the success of
cross-sector partnerships, there were two research questions guiding this study. They relate to the
perception of collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners at aggregate and
disaggregate levels.

1.5.1 - Research Question 1
At an aggregate level, are there differences in the perception of collaboration between mandated
and non-mandated partners?

1.5.2 - Research Question 2
Are there differences in the perception of collaboration for disaggregated components of
collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners?

1.6 - Organization of the Study
Chapter 1 described the challenges of cross-sector partnerships and introduces trust as a
critical factor to the success of cross-sector partnerships. The theoretical framework of the study,
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), was established as a powerful theory and as an approach to
study what may be happening in cross-sector partnerships that have partners that are mandated
and partners that are not mandated. In Chapter 2, the TCE literature validates the importance of
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trust as a transaction cost and a factor of collaboration in successful partnerships. Chapter 3
outlines the non-experimental quantitative research design that was used to collect data and
establishes the methodological rationale of the study based on previous literature. Chapter 4
presents the data collected from the study and an analysis of statistical results. Finally, Chapter 5
provides a discussion of the study results and recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature
2.1 - Introduction
This chapter presents the literature related to this study. TCE theory, transaction costs and
collaboration are further explored, along with the importance of trust in cross-sector partnerships.
The chapter concludes by introducing factors determined to influence success in cross-sector
partnership collaboration.

2.2 - Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Overview
Neoclassical economics is based on the assumption that a price mechanism exists, and as
a result, in a competitive market, there is supply and demand. The supplier and the buyer will
reach an agreement without any negotiations because price is set by the free market. The
exchange cost is only the cost of the item and therefore, a good will be produced by a firm only
if it can be produced at a price lower than the market price. In neoclassical theory a firm is like a
black-box that interacts with the market to seek knowledge for its functioning (Verma &
Churchman, 1997; Verma, 1998); the organization of economic activities is taken as a given and
firms are characterized as profit-maximizing producers (Williamson, 1985). The firm chooses a
production function to maximize the firm’s performance (Henderson and Quant, 1980). The
black-box of neoclassical economics assumes costless market transactions where there are zero
transaction costs (Coase, 1937). Hence, it does not include costs that could be motivated by selfinterest, opportunism and lower levels of trust.
In contrast to neoclassical economics, Coase (1937) offers an economic explanation of
transaction costs that helps to understand why partnerships and companies are formed going
beyond just trading through contracts on a market. In contrast to production costs, transaction
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costs are hidden costs that are not taken into account. Coase argues that there are a number of
transaction costs to procuring something from the market that are in addition to just the price of
the good (Coase, 1937).
Neoclassical economics suggests a firm’s vertical boundary decisions are determined by
technological factors (i.e.: economies of scale or scope) while TCE distinguishes itself from
neoclassical economics by being influenced by characteristics associated with the efficiency of
the chosen form of organization (Williamson, 1985). In other words, TCE explains what
neoclassical economics failed to consider: bounded rationality, uncertainty, asset specificity and
opportunism behavior (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, one can come to the conclusion that some
forms of governance are more suitable than others for a given transaction. Within TCE, all
economic activity revolves around a transaction that is exchanging a good or service between
two or more economic actors (Macher & Richman, 2008). Williamson (1985) argued that in
order to optimize that exchange, an appropriate governance mechanism must be matched to the
nature of the transaction.
Coase (1960) argues that as transaction costs continue to rise, firms may be less likely to
internalize externalities on their own. He suggests that direct government regulation may be a
solution in lieu of a legal system that could determine allowable market transactions (Coase,
1960). Coase (1960, p. 17) notes that “the government may impose regulations which state what
people must do or must not do and which have to be obeyed.” Coase (1960) suggests that the
government act as a ‘super firm’ which could provide a solution at a lower cost than could a
private firm, by avoiding the market altogether. Higher and higher levels of centralization may
need to deal with social costs (Coase, 1960). His work suggests that solutions may first be found
in the market, then the firm, then the state and even further to a level of aggregation on a country
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or global wide scale. This work is important when viewing social problems, such as workforce
supply and demand, and potential solutions in the form of mandated cross-sector partnerships. In
addition, Williamson (1991) subsequently addressed the potential for hybrid forms of
governance that share some characteristics of both markets and hierarchies, and although he
acknowledged that conventional TCE (and his work on the subject) focuses only on dyadic
interorganizational relationships, he noted that the core principles in TCE can be applied to the
analysis of network relationships. As such, TCE can be a lens to view direct government
regulation (mandated partnerships with mandated partners). This study used this economic lens
to determine how collaboration may influence transaction costs and therefore, the success of
partnerships.

2.2.1 - Transaction Cost Definitions
Many different definitions of transaction costs appear in the literature. Coase (1937)
defines the term transaction costs as costs using price mechanisms associated with specifying,
negotiating, and enforcing contracts. He argued that if transactions taking place in the market
were too costly, transactions would be taken within the boundaries of the firm (Coase, 1937).
Arrow (1969) defines transaction costs as the costs of running the economic system. In the mid1970s, Williamson emphasized transactions in the analysis of governance structures, referring to
this approach as “transaction cost approach.” (Williamson, 1975). In 1985, Williamson defined
transaction costs to include the costs of drafting, negotiating, and enforcing an agreement, along
with the costs of governance and bonding to secure commitments (Williamson, 1985). Unlike
previous approaches where transaction costs have a fixed value, Williamson’s approach provides
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the notion that transaction costs have relative values and can be different from one organization
to another (Williamson, 1985).
Wallis and North (1986) define transaction costs as the costs of processing and conveying
information, coordinating, purchasing, marketing, advertising, selling, handling legal matters,
shipping, and managing and supervising. Davis (1986) defines transaction costs as the costs of
obtaining information, monitoring behavior, compensating intermediaries, and enforcing
contracts. Additionally, North (1990) explains transaction costs as the costs of measuring the
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and
enforcing agreements.

2.2.2 - Composition of Transaction Costs
According to Williamson (1985), there are two kinds of transaction costs: (1) the ex ante
costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement, such as search and contract costs
and (2) the ex post costs of haggling, governance, and bonding to secure commitments. In the
case of partnerships, ex ante costs arise at the beginning and ex post costs occur during the
partnership’s lifespan (Williamson, 1985). Table 1 outlines the most common sources and types
of transaction costs.
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Table 1
Sources and Types of Transaction Costs

Asset Specificity

Environmental Uncertainty

Behavioral Uncertainty

Safeguarding

Adaptation

Performance Evaluation

Direct Costs

Costs of crafting
safeguards

Communication, negotiation,
and coordination costs

Opportunity Costs

Failure to invest in
productive assets

Maladaptation; Failure to
adapt

Screening and selection
costs (ex ante);
Measurement costs (ex
post)
Failure to identify
appropriate partners (ex
ante); Productivity losses
through effort adjustments
(ex post)

A: Source of Transaction Costs
Nature of Governance Problem
B. Type of Transaction Costs

Note: Rindfeisch & Heide (1997) summarize the source and nature of the most common forms of
transaction costs.

The two assumptions that affect the critical dimensions of a given transaction are: (1)
individuals may behave opportunistically; and (2) individuals are characterized by bounded
rationality (Williamson, 1985). Individuals often act out of their self-interest and towards their
best opportunity, seeking to sometimes exploit a situation to their own advantage (Williamson,
1979). This does not always happen but, the risk of opportunism is always present.
Opportunism in TCE goes beyond conventional economic theories of organizational
behavior (Cyert & March, 1992; March & Simon, 1993; Simon, 1979) and collective action
(Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Taylor, 1990) that presume organizations will act in their own selfinterest by assuming some organizations will seek to take advantage of others with whom they
transact. This potential behavior makes opportunism a key source of distrust among
13

organizations (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Das & Rahman, 2002; Hosmer, 1995; Vlaar, Van
de Bosch, & Volberda, 2007;). Researchers studying trust in relation to TCE suggest that in the
absence of opportunism there is little or no need for trust (Bradach & Eccles, 1989, Das & Teng,
2001, Hill, 1990). TCE does not depend on trust but acknowledges the potential for trust to lower
transaction costs and the importance of the appropriate selection of governance (Dyer & Chu,
2003; Hill, 1990; Noorderhaven, 1996).
Additionally, due to a lack of knowledge and information-processing capabilities,
individuals are not always able to act rationally, even if they initially intend to do so. Because of
bounded rationality, it is impossible to predict partner’s potential future actions. Since partners
may have to closely monitor each other’s performance and create a way to enforce their
agreement, transaction costs are likely to increase (Gantz, 2012).
The critical dimensions of transactions are: (1) asset specificity; and (2) uncertainty
(Williamson, 1985). With regard to asset specificity, a valuable asset may be attached to a
particular transaction. Asset specificity can be explained by the extent an investment is made to
support a particular transaction that has a higher value to that transaction than compared to if it
was redeployed for another purpose (Williamson, 1975). Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that
transaction-specific assets are not redeployable and are too specialized, such as human
investments in knowledge.
When partners have to invest a portion of partnership resources (financial and nonfinancial, such as time) in purposes other than those associated with productive activities
(outputs), the partnership’s performance drops (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Therefore, the
specificity of assets for specific transactions could increase coordination activities between
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partners, as well as their intensity, and thus increases transaction costs (Artz & Brush, 2000;
Erickson, 2001; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).
Uncertainty intensifies problems that arise because of bounded rationality and
opportunism (Erickson, 2001). Because of uncertainty, transaction costs can increase. For
example, partners may seek to reduce uncertainty by negotiating complex contracts which in turn
can increase ex ante transaction costs and later, if renegotiation is needed, possibly increase ex
post transaction costs (Jobin, 2008). This uncertainty is exacerbated when you have cross-sector
partnerships that involve partners that are not similar to each other due to the nature of sector
differences, thus, leading to a more conflicting environment.

2.3 - Importance of Collaboration
Cross-sector partnerships can decline or underperform, be terminated or inappropriately
persist (Inkpen & Ross, 2001), face collaborative inertia (Huxham,1996), or persist latently
(Cestero,1999). Partnerships can have many challenges such as, a lack of clarity in defining
common goals, complexity of accountability structures, resource capacity, performance
measurement, and leadership and trust concerns (Gray & Jenkins, 2003; NAO, 2001; OAGC,
1999; OECD, 2001; Stern, 2004). Additionally, cross-sector partnership challenges can be
lumped into themes such as mistrust, differing institutional cultures and practices, and
insufficient partnership resources. Many partnerships, particularly regional partnerships are
riddled with challenges to collaboration, such as competition fueled by scare and sometimes
declining public funding.
Collaboration is defined in a number of ways in the literature. Mattessich, Murray-Close,
& Monsey (2001) state that scholars do use different terms interchangeably to refer to
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collaboration, such as cooperation and coordination. Other words found in the literature that
express collaboration are roundtable, partnership, relationship, alliance, consortia, network, and
coalition (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Winer & Ray, 1994).
Bruder (1997) describes collaboration as specific actions taken that could not be done by a single
organization. The working definition of collaboration used in this study is “Collaboration is a
mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations to
achieve common goals,” (Mattessich & Johnson, 2001, p.4, 2018, p. 5).
The literature reiterates that cross-sector partnerships are formed in response to issues that
no individual partner or sector can address effectively on its own (Seigel, 2010; Bryson et al, 2006).
Cross-sector collaboration involves “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities,
and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could
not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (Bryson et al, 2006, p. 49). Researchers
content that the most efficient collaboration is evident when organizations collaborate using
methods that synthesize the different perspectives of each partner in understanding complex
problems (Frey, Lohmeier, Lee, & Tollefson, 2006; Gajda, 2004; Gajda & Koliba, 2007; Thomson
& Perry, 2006).
The relationships between sectors in cross-sector partnerships can take different forms
and change over time (Austin, 2000). Googins and Rochlin (2000) discuss the many forms that
partnerships can take, with most relationships being just a one-way transfer of resources.
Googins and Rochlin (2000) further state that this relationship does not seem to satisfy the
intuitive conditions of a “true partnership” between sectors. Thomson and Perry (2006)
summarize the process of collaboration as consisting of five dimensions: governance,
administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity.
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2.3.1 - Collaboration Motivation
The primary motivation for partnerships is normally assumed to be strategic
interdependence in which one organization needs resources and/or capabilities that it does not
possess. There must be motivation for partners in cross-sector partnerships to devote resources and
time to build and sustain a partnership. If partnerships are to be sustainable, there must be intrinsic
value for all partners (Austin, 2000; Googins & Rochlin, 2000) and therefore, it is important to
examine the motives and drivers of partners (Cappelli, Shapiro, & Shumanis, 1998; Johnson, 2012;
Longoria, 1999).
Motivations in partnerships will reflect partner divergent institutional goals and purpose
(Bennett & Thompson, 2011). However, there are core pieces of commonality across the sectors.
Motivations of collaboration may be that partners have an interest in greater financial capacity
(Bennett & Thompson, 2011; Guthrie et al, 2008; Hoff, 2002; Smith & Wholstetter, 2006) or by
legislative mandates that provide funding to partnering organizations (Cappelli et al., 1998;
Longoria, 1999; Johnson, 2012). Other motivation could be through building community capacity
and public perception (Bartlett, Frederick, Gulbrandsen & Murillo, 2002; Bennett & Thompson,
2011; Edens & Gilsinan, 2005; Hands, 2005; Hoff, 2002; Longoria, 1999; Seitanidi, Koufopoulos,
& Palmer, 2010). Different from alliances between same sector organizations, partners in crosssector partnerships have different goals and are motivated differently; these motivations, as a
result, can lead to power imbalances (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011).
The literature suggests that it is important to study the divergences and convergences of
the collaboration level among various sector partners. In particular, the literature points to the
role of divergent partner motivations and how this may affect partner engagement (Bartlett et al.,
2002; Bennett & Thompson, 2011; Edens & Gilsinan, 2005; Hands, 2009; Hoff, 2002; Longoria,
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1999; Seitanidi et al., 2010). As previously discussed, transaction costs can rise when a partner
from one sector forms a partnership with another sector that does not have goal congruence.
Graddy & Ferris (2007) refer to the public and nonprofit sectors as both sharing a commitment to
service provision and the lack of profit motivation. This indicates that the public sector would
only be expected to partner with private sector partners when they provide a unique benefit that
will maintain or lower transaction costs (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). These findings in the literature
drove the decision to study the collaboration among partnerships that included different sectors,
and additionally, how motivations may be present or absent in partnerships with mandated and
non-mandated partners.

2.4 - Importance of Trust
Trust is a primary concept in the cross-sector collaboration and interorganizational
literature (Bierly & Gallagher, 2007; Zand, 1972; Wood & Gray, 1991; Mattessieh et al., 2001)
and in effective collaboration and partnering. (Getha-Taylor, 2012). Partnership has been defined
as “at least two agencies with common interests working together, in a relationship characterized
by some degree of trust, equality and reciprocity” (Rees, Mullins, & Bovaird, 2012, p. 14). This
relationship is assumed to contrast with market-based, contractual relationships which are
assumed to be low trust and adversarial in nature, although there are exceptions (Rees et al.,
2012).
Trust within a group, such as a partnership, is not just the aggregate of the relationships
with other group members, which is what is typically researched, but the attitude that the
individual holds toward the group as a collective (Korsgaard, Brodt, & Sapienza, 2003). There is
limited empirical research on how trust is perceived in groups or collectives, which according to
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Korsgaard et al., (2003), provides a strong argument for the validity of viewing trust in the
collective. Trust has emerged as the attitude most critical for cooperation within groups and
organizations and a powerful motivator of cooperation (Smith, 1995).
Trust is a central element of modern theories of organizational management and
sociology (Arrow, 1974; Coleman, 1990; Gambetta,1988; Hardin, 2001; Kramer & Cook, 2004;
March, 1994). Whether or not trust exists is a key consideration when assessing the nature of
relationships between two or more parties as individuals, groups, or organizations (Alter & Hage,
1992; Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008; McEvily & Zaheer, 2004; Provan & Sydow, 2008; Ring &
Van de Ven, 1994). Various forms of trust are considered attributes or contributing factors in
sociological theories intended to explain interorganizational dynamics and individual and
organizational behavior (Kramer, 2006). As organizations operate in increasingly interconnected
environments, their ability to negotiate and manage trust in both internally and externally facing
contexts is viewed as an essential ingredient to their success (Kramer, 2006; Kramer & Tyler,
1996; Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Saunders, Skinner, & Lewicki, 2010).
Research has shown that trust among partners play a critical role in partnership
performance (Gulati, 1998; NAO, 2001: 9; OAGC, 1999: 5–11; OECD, 2001: 44; Stern, 2004;
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perone, 1998). Trust has been positively
associated with performance within strategic alliances (Luo, 2002; Zaheer et al., 1998). Bardach
(1998) identifies trust as a key element in one of two dimensions of interagency collaborative
capacity. The findings of Huxham and Vangen's (2005) extensive research on collaboration led
to the conclusion that trust is a critical component of collaboration. In her study of 422
collaborations, Thomson (2001) found evidence to support Huxham and Vangen's conclusions.
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Table 2
Additional Literature on the Concept of Trust
Literature

Reference

Trust is essential for cooperation.

Child, Faulkner, & Tallman
(2005); Faulkner & De Rond
(2000); Lane (1998); Loveridge
(2000)

Successful alliances exhibit trust between the partners;
unsuccessful alliances exhibit a lack of trust.

Konza & Lewin (1998)

Trust is positively related to alliance performance.

Krishnan et. al. (2006)

High levels of trust are a good predictor of alliance
success.

Schumacher (2006)

2.4.1 - Trust and Transaction Costs in Partnerships
Trust does not feature prominently in some economic theories, but where theory does
accommodate trust, it is most commonly considered for its impact on economic efficiency in
theories, such as, transaction cost economic or resource-based perspectives (Leiblein, 2003;
Madhok & Tallman, 1998). Trust was identified, long ago, as perhaps the most efficient
mechanism for governing a transaction and critical to transactional relationships (Arrow, 1974).
Studies in the literature have established that trust can reduce transaction costs (Dyer, 1997; Dyer
& Chu, 2003; Zaheer, et al., 1998) and facilitate the exchange of resources and information
(Uzzi, 1997). Williamson’s view of trust as too narrow to reflect real-world organizations is
shared by several theorists going beyond Williamson to acknowledge the potential value of trust
in reducing transaction costs (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Gulati, 1995; Noorderhaven, 1996;
Pitelis, 1993; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Grady & Ferris (2007) discusses the complexity of
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the issue of interdependence versus trust, a key factor in many alliances. Partners may realize
voids in assets which leads to the recognition of further dissimilarities that may raise transaction
costs and dispel any pre-existing trust that may have been previously present.
Trust is a central component of interorganizational collaboration because it reduces
opportunism and transaction costs more quickly than other organizing mechanisms (Bierly &
Gallagher, 2007; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Ostrom, 1998; Smith et al., 1995). Nooteboom et
al., (1997) maintain that trust due to social norms or personal relations is underrepresented in
TCE and that trust often substitutes for formal contracts and controls. Yet, TCE finds trust alone
insufficient to safeguard against opportunism, and relies on explicit controls such as contracts,
monitoring, and enforcement (Lane, 1998; Williamson, 1985).
Furthermore, controls such as monitoring can have unintended consequences, as partners
being monitored may perceive additional monitoring as an indication of distrust directed at them
(Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007; Guerra, 2002; Kramer, 1999), reducing the level of trust in the
entity performing the monitoring. Some sociological theory suggests that trust itself serves as a
control against opportunistic behavior, especially when reputations are intended to be preserved
(Lane, 1998; Zucker, 1986). However, trust alone cannot eliminate the threat of opportunism
entirely, as it always exists, even in long-term relationships that have a history of trustworthy
behavior (Dasgupta, 1988, Hardin, 1991).
Where trust manifests in the use of informal contracts and self-enforcement rather than
formal agreements and legal sanctions (Ring, 2008), partnerships can realize cost efficiencies
compared to formal legal agreements (Deakin, Lane, & Wilkinson, 1994; Lyons & Mehta, 1997).
As trust declines, partners are more likely to spend more resources monitoring each other’s
contributions than time on producing additional outcomes (Nooteboom et al., 1997). When this
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happens, partnership productivity can decline (Nooteboom et al., 1997). The higher the levels of
trust among partners, less resources are necessary with regards of monitoring and enforcement
costs, hence the higher the partnership performance (Dyer, 1997). Developing and maintaining
trust requires organizations to devote time, effort, and investment of resources (asset specificity)
all of which involve costs depending on the context and the parties involved. Yet, trust improves
economic efficiency in many types of collaboration, primarily in terms of lowering transaction
costs and the costs of coordinating and governing partnerships.
Research has shown that there is uncertainty surrounding strategic alliances and
partnerships (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer et al.,1998). Several
studies have identified trust between partners as a key factor that may help minimize
uncertainties and reduce the threat of opportunism in strategic alliances (Das & Teng, 1998;
Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Garguilo, 1999; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Wuyts &
Geyskens, 2005). When trust is present, the partnership will be able to weather uncertainties
better than when trust is not present (Parkhe, 1993; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Larson, 1992;
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Hill, 1990). The primary benefit resulting from trust in
interorganizational relationships is the reduction in costs that would be incurred in the absence of
trust (Hill, 1990).

2.4.2 - Trust and Volitional Partnership
Potential partners must assess the trade-offs in establishing a partnership, such as the
benefits of cooperation and the risks of vulnerability to opportunism (Graddy & Ferris, 2007).
Partners will normally seek to mitigate this risk by selecting partners that offer the least threat
(Graddy & Ferris, 2007). This prompts partners to align with partners with whom they have the
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greatest strategic interdependence (Verma, 2007; Graddy & Ferris, 2007). As gains are weighed
against risks, organizations will seek partners it trusts (Graddy & Ferris, 2007).
Graddy & Ferris (2007) suggest that organizations will prefer partners with who they
have ties and social network connections. Gulati (1995) discovered that organizations having
previous ties were more likely to form alliances, particularly as environmental uncertainty
increases. Graddy & Ferris (2007) conclude that prior partner interaction is an important precondition to forming an effective alliance.
A defining dimension of collaboration is that partners must share a dual identity, and they
must maintain their own distinct identities and organizational authority separate from (though
simultaneously with) the collaborative identity (Thomson, 2001). The literature points to this
reality that causes tension between self-interest created by individual organizational missions and
an identity that is also for the collective interest of the partnership (Bardach, 1998; Tschirhart,
Christensen, and Perry ,2005; Van de Ven, Emmett, and Koenig 1975; Wood & Gray, 1991).
Huxham (1996, p. 15) refers to this tension as the autonomy-accountability dilemma and
concludes that because "collaboration is voluntary, partners generally need to justify their
involvement in it in terms of its contribution to their own aims" or they will seek to not
collaborate at all.
In reality, partner makeup is not always based on voluntarism and could even be from
reluctant membership (Kirchhoff & Ljunggren, 2016). Some partnerships may be mandated to
exist and have mandated partner requirements as is the case for WDBs authorized under WIOA.
When partnerships are not voluntary and are imposed through legislation, partnerships can have
equality issues (Kirchhoff & Ljunggren, 2016) and uneven trust balances, allowing trust to serve
more informally as a commodity.
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Mandatory partnership membership could be institutional, instituted from a legislative
mandate, but to further complicate, it could also be individual and more personal. For example,
this may happen when an organization serving as a partner designates an employee, perhaps
unwillingly, to serve on its behalf. Therefore, whether or not someone is mandated or required
to be in a partnership can be somewhat subjective. Rees et al., (2012, p. 52) concludes that 'while
there is theoretically no necessary conflict between competition and collaboration, in practice,
partnerships have tended to work more effectively when they are underpinned by voluntary trustbased relationships rather than by imposed or mandated partnership forms or by competitive
arrangements that undermine trust.'
Furthermore, Game theory indicates that cooperative behavior is more likely when there
is a longer-term expectation of cooperation (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). Partnerships that promote
long-term or include mandatory partners determined by legislation to remain indefinitely in the
partnership, may be more likely to succeed. (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). Sullivan & Skelcher (2002)
p. 83) make the case that short-term contracts versus longer term relational partnerships for
delivery of public services was motivated by the expectation that “trust and mutuality will
replace the suspicion and divergence of interests found in traditional short-term contracting.”
Yet, the use of mandated partnerships has increasingly displaced trust-based partnerships
through the introduction of external conditions and controls, with legislative and regulatory
mechanisms to encourage partnerships (Hudson, 1999). Armistead & Pettigrew (2008, p.22)
argue that specific cases of mandated partnerships can cause “a tendency to try to make the
partnership work by following a set of prescriptions or check lists which might satisfy
government, but which fail to address the dynamics of partnership performance and the causes of
partnership failure.” Dowling & Glendinning (2004) conceptualize the success of partnerships by
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how well partners work together and the long-term sustainability of the partnership. It is critical
that the value of trust and other potential components of collaboration that could contribute to
more successful conditions for mandated partnerships be better understood. A further
examination of non-voluntarism in partnerships may reveal different perspectives on trust and
important collaboration components, both within and across sectors.

2.5 - Cross-Sector Collaboration Success
In 2015, Krathu, Pichler, Xiao, Werthner, Neidhardt, Zapletal, and Huemer conducted a
qualitative study on interorganizational success factors and after reviewing 177 publications,
found that trust was a factor that played a significant role in collaboration success. Mattessich &
Johnson (2018) presented 22 factors that influence the success of collaborations after a review of
74 relevant studies. They provided a comprehensive review of empirical collaboration literature
by conducting a meta-analysis of factors for successful collaboration. One of the 22 factors is
mutual respect, understanding and trust. Forty-one of the 74 studies were identified as
contributing to the factor of mutual respect, understanding, and trust. The survey used in this
study measured the 22 factors that Mattessich & Johnson (2018) determined would influence the
success of collaborations.
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Table 3
Collaboration Success Factors
Category

Collaboration Success Factors

Environment





Membership Characteristics





History of collaboration or cooperation in the
community
Collaborative group seen as a legitimate leader in the
community
Favorable political and social climate



Mutual respect, understanding, and trust
Appropriate cross section of members
Members see collaboration as being in their selfinterest
Ability to compromise

Process and Structure









Members share a stake in both process and outcome
Multiple layers of participation
Flexibility
Development of clear roles and policy guidelines
Adaptability to changing conditions
Appropriate pace of development
Evaluation and continuous learning

Communication




Open and frequent communication
Established informal relationships and communication
links

Purpose





Concrete, attainable goals and objectives
Shared vision
Unique purpose

Resources





Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time
Skilled leadership
Engaged stakeholders

Note: Mattesich et al., (2018) Collaboration Success Factors
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
3.1 - Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design used in this study. This study
sought to determine if partners’ perception of collaboration was different. A conceptual diagram
of the primary variables that guided this study is presented. Additionally, chapter 3 includes the
study population, data collection procedures, and study limitations.

3.2 - Research Design
For this study, a non-experimental quantitative methodology was used. Quantitative data
collected on perceptions are recognized as correlational and descriptive research that allow an
area of interest to be described (Isaac & Michael, 1997). Plonsky and Gass (2011) noted that
quantitative research designs are appropriate when the research aims to examine perceptions and
observations. After a review of a study that conducted a mixed-method approach using the same
survey instrument, it was determined that a quantitative approach only would be the best fit for
this study. Adding open-ended questions to the already 40+ item survey resulted in incomplete
surveys and survey fatigue (Culver-Dockings, 2012).
This study is cross-sectional, and therefore, data was collected at one point in time
(Creswell, 2009). Survey design was chosen to be the most appropriate for this study and served
as a preferred method of data collection because it had quick turnaround time and was of low
cost to implement (Creswell, 2009). “The survey method is one of the most important data
collection methods in the social sciences, and as such, it is used extensively to collect
information on numerous subjects of research” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 225).
Additionally, the survey method as a questionnaire eliminated the interviewer bias that could be
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evident in a qualitative study because there was no personal contact and created an atmosphere
for anonymity.

3.2.1 - Independent Variables
The independent variables in this study are the 22 factors included in the survey
instrument, the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory (Mattessich & Johnson, 2018). These
factors are evidence-based factors that increase the likelihood that collaboration will succeed
(Mattessich & Johnson, 2018). These factors are the study variables and include: (1) History of
collaboration or cooperation in the community; (2) Collaborative group seen as a legitimate
leader in the community; (3) Favorable political and social climate; (4) Mutual respect,
understanding, and trust; (5) Appropriate cross section of members; (6) Members see
collaboration as being in their self-interest; (7) Ability to compromise; (8) Members share a stake
in both process and outcome; (9) Multiple layers of participation; (10) Flexibility; (11)
Development of clear roles and policy guidelines; (12) Adaptability to changing conditions; (13)
Appropriate pace of development; (14) Evaluation and continuous learning; (15) Open and
frequent communication; (16) Established informal relationships and communication links; (17)
Concrete, attainable goals and objectives; (18) Shared vision; (19) Unique purpose; (20)
Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time; (21) Skilled leadership; and (22) Engaged
stakeholders. Additional information on the survey instrument is included in the Instrumentation
section of this chapter.

28

3.2.2 - Dependent Variable
The responses to the questions on the survey were used to create the dependent variable,
the “Perception of Collaboration.” Because there is no direct measure of the “Perception of
Collaboration,” the survey responses (22 variables) were used to derive factor scores as proxies
for the dependent variable.

3.2.3 - Demographic Variables
The demographic variables included partnership/board identity, the type of sector the
partner belonged to (private, public, or nonprofit), whether a partner was required to be on the
workforce board or not (mandated/non-mandated) and the length of time served on the board
(partnership). The private sector is operationalized as all for-profit businesses that are not owned
or operated by the government. The public sector is operationalized as the part of an economy
that is controlled by the government. The nonprofit sector is operationalized as a group of
organizations formed for purposes other than generating profit and in which no part of
the organization's income is distributed to its members, directors, or officers.
The Section 107 of the WIOA law mandates which partners shall or may maintain
membership on WDBs (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014). WDB members
are appointed by local elected officials from nominations submitted from the local organizations
and businesses (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014). A business member
majority is required and must meet 51% of the board composition. Additionally, the Virginia
Board of Workforce Development published Policy 200-02: Establishment and Membership of
Local Workforce Development Boards (VBWD Policy 200-02, 2016) outlining additional
guidance for the membership of the WDBs and describes in detail which members are mandatory
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and which members are optional (Appendix A). The WDB must contain 51% representation of
the private sector, however, there is no mandatory requirement for which private sector
companies must participate on WDBs.

Table 4
Demographic Characteristics as Variables
Variable

Description

Sector Identity

Private, Public or Nonprofit

Board Identity

Name of Virginia WDB serving on

Partner Membership

Required to be on the board (Mandated/Non-mandated)

Length of Time Serving on the Board

0-12 months; 13-24 months; 25-48 months; 49+ months

3.2.4 - Conceptual Diagram
A conceptual diagram is used to describe the concepts of a study and their relationships
in an abstract way. The following diagram shows a visual depiction of the primary concepts in
this study.
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Figure 1
Conceptual Diagram

3.2.5 - Population
The defined study population was the Governor-certified functioning workforce board
members from all 15 WDBs across Virginia, as mandated to exist by the WIOA. The identity of
the WDB members is public information and the entire population was surveyed. Under WIOA,
board membership cannot be manipulated based on federal and state regulations for local board
composition and board member appointments (Johnson, 2017). As of August 2019, a census of
the 15 WDBs in Virginia was conducted and 459 board members were discovered to be publicly
listed on the WDB websites. Inclusion criteria are the requirements an individual must have to be
eligible to participate in a survey (Fink, 2003). Criteria to become a WDB member aligns with
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local board member requirements as defined by WIOA and Virginia state policy. The following
organizations are mandated partners required from both the WIOA and VWDB policy: (1) Labor
Organization; (2) Joint Labor Management Apprenticeship Program; (3) Apprenticeship
Program; (4) Institution of Higher Education providing workforce investment activities; (5)
Economic and Community Development; (6) State Employment Office; (7) Title 1 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (8) Adult Education Program administering WIOA Title II Adult
Education and Family Literacy (AEFLA) activities; and (9) Career and Technical Education
Program (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 2014 &VBWD Policy 200-02, 2016). The
population selected ensured representation of the operationalized sectors because of the
mandatory requirement of certain public and nonprofit sector participation and the requirement
that 51% of board members must be from the private sector. Regional workforce development
collaborations, such as the WDBs have emerged as noteworthy approaches to tackle complex
problems within a region’s workforce development system (Melendez, Borges-Mendez, Visser
& Rosofsky, 2015).
A non-probability purposive sampling method was chosen for this study because of the
additional requirements for board membership mandated by the Virginia policy through the
Virginia Workforce Development Board, in addition to the WIOA federal law. Because states
are given the flexibility to expand the requirements for mandatory membership of the WDBs, it
would have been difficult to obtain comparable samples across states.

3.2.6 - Instrumentation
The instrument used in this study was the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory
(Appendix B). The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory contains questions related to 22
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factors (variables) that influence the success of collaboration as identified in the literature by the
authors using meta-analysis (Mattessich & Johnson, 2018). An extensive review of the literature
led to the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory developed by Mattessich and Monsey (1992).
Using meta-analysis, Mattessich and Monsey (1992) used 133 collaboration studies from 19751991 to determine 19 factors that impact successful collaboration among organizations. A second
and third edition of the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory has been released with updated
literature, and as a result, the survey tool was enhanced to now consist of 22 factors that
influence the success of collaboration.
The survey consisted of 44 items scored on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The survey respondent was asked to indicate what board they are
serving on and if they are part of the private, public or nonprofit sector. Additional demographic
questions included how long they had been serving on the board and if they were required to be
on the board. This latter phrase “required to be on the board” had room for ambiguity because
someone may be a volunteer although her/his employer may be an organization that is mandated
to participate. This was obviated by allowing survey respondents to self-report whether or not
they were required to be on the board, without regard to whether this requirement was solely
institutional or individual. The survey was designed to take approximately 15-25 minutes to
complete.
The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory was developed as a tool for partnerships to
access the strengths and weaknesses of collaboration. Over time, it has been used in multiple
research studies (Townsend & Shelley, 2008), indirectly buttressing its validity and usefulness.
Townsend & Shelley (2008) contend that the established psychometric properties of the Wilder
instrument permit researchers to employ more powerful statistical test procedures.
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Reliability tests for the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory were first conducted by
Derose, Beatty, & Jackson (2004) and later by Townsend and Shelley (2008). Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients were used to determine the consistency of survey questions (Tavakol & Dennick,
2011). These studies found similar results with Cronbach alphas for 14 of the 20 factors between
.66 and .86 (Derose et al., 2004). Three factors had lower reliability but were still considered to
have indications of important relationships between the items within the factors. Townsend &
Shelley (2008) found there was a statistically significant theoretical structure of the instrument
that grouped the 40 collaborative items into four meaningful components. The four components
of the factor analysis explained 55.5% of the total variance (Townsend & Shelley, 2008). Both
Vogt (2000) and Derose et al., (2004) determined the instrument to be a measure of collaborative
effort, establishing validity for the instrument.
All of these studies were conducted on the 2 nd edition, the previous version of the Wilder
Collaboration Factors Inventory from 2001 (Mattessich et al., 2001) that included 20 of the
current 22 factors being used in this study. The two factors that were added in the most recent
(2018) version of the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory were: (1) Evaluation and
continuous learning; and (2) Engaged stakeholders (Mattessich & Johnson, 2018).

3.2.7 - Data Collection Procedures
Policies pertaining to the overall ethical treatment of human subjects are enforced by the
Virginia Commonwealth University Institutional Review Board (VCU-IRB). VCU IRB approval
was obtained on August 6, 2019. (Appendix C)
The population of this research was conducted with adults only. Consent was outlined in
all population communication and within the online survey. The survey provided anonymity of
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the respondent’s name. It was assured to survey respondents that their survey responses would
remain confidential as an individual response and would be reported in aggregate by
partnership/board, sector and whether a partner was mandated and non-mandated. Any results
reported on a WDB level remained anonymous. The data collected for this study was protected
electronically by the use of computer passwords. No personally identifying information was
obtained from any participant. Data for this study was collected online using the survey
electronic software available from REDCap. Electronic data collection and storage allows for
easier and faster data collection (Benfield & Szlemko, 2006).
Before the survey was sent out, a pilot test of the survey was done with several workforce
development professionals. Through the pilot test, the amount of time to take the survey was
gauged and the pilot was used to make minor word changes which made the survey instructions
less ambiguous.
The survey was sent to all 15 WDB Executive Directors in Virginia. Before the survey
was sent to the WDB Executive Directors, the researcher contacted the Virginia Association of
Workforce Directors (VAWD) co-chairs to inform them of the study and ask for their support.
After support was obtained, the researcher contacted the 15 WDB Executive Directors by email
(Appendix D) to inform them of the study, to gain support for the survey distribution and to find
out if there were any questions regarding the study. The researcher gave the WDB Executive
Director an opportunity to set up a time to speak by phone about the study if there was a desire to
do so and to answer any additional questions. After all of the Executive Directors consented to
participate in the study by responding with affirmation via email, they were sent an introductory
email (Appendix E) with the survey distribution instructions and the online survey to send to all
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of their board members. The introductory email explained the purpose of the study and the
survey instrument.
All respondents were asked to fill out the online survey within a three-week period. Nine
members were listed as serving on two WDBs that were in close proximity of each other. The
survey instructions asked respondents to fill out a survey for each WDB they were serving on.
Reminder emails (Appendix F) were sent one week after the survey was initially distributed by
the Executive Director. The distribution dates were confirmed by the Executive Directors. A
second reminder email (Appendix G) was sent a week after the first reminder email, noting that
the survey timeframe would be closing soon. If the response rate was less than 30% of any
particular WDB by week two, the researcher emailed the Executive Director to inquire about any
additional strategies to obtain more survey responses. To incentivize individuals to participate,
the researcher agreed to provide survey results at an aggregate level only for individual WDBs
and for Virginia across all WDBs.

3.2.8 - Data Analysis Procedures
Once the timeframe closed for survey responses, the researcher cleaned the data. If a
respondent did not complete the survey, the responses to the survey questions that were
completed were used and pairwise deletion was used in data analysis. The researcher excluded
any surveys that did not contain the demographic and geographical information being asked. One
survey respondent responded that they were in both, the private and public sectors. Another
survey respondent responded that they did not know if they were required to be on the board.
Because these responses were outliers and would create a unique group of one for the variables
of sector and mandated/non-mandated participation status, the researcher removed these two
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responses from the survey data. After the data was collected, descriptive and inferential
statistical data analysis was conducted.

3.3 - Research Questions and Hypotheses
There are two research questions guiding this study. They relate to the perception of
collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners at aggregate and disaggregate
levels. These and the ensuing hypotheses are explained below.

3.3.1 - Research Question 1
At an aggregate level, are there differences in the perception of collaboration between mandated
and non-mandated partners? Three hypotheses were tested.

3.3.1.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 tests whether the perception of collaboration is stronger comparing the aggregate
groups of mandated partners and non-mandated partners. An independent t-test was done to
determine the difference between the two groups.

H10: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do not have a stronger
perception of collaboration than mandated partners.
H1A: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do have a stronger
perception of collaboration than mandated partners.
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3.3.1.2 - Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 tests the difference in perception of collaboration between mandated partners only
and from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was done to determine variances between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration.

H20: The perception of collaboration is not different for mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
H2A: The perception of collaboration is different for mandated partners from the private, public
and nonprofit sectors.

3.3.1.3 - Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 tests the difference in perception of collaboration between the non-mandated
partners only from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. A one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was done to determine variances between the non-mandated partners’ perception of
collaboration.

H30: The perception of collaboration is not different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
H3A: The perception of collaboration is different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
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3.3.2 - Research Question 2
The second research question continues the same analysis but after separating
collaboration into four component parts using principal component analysis. The components
are: (1) “Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy;”
and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” Each hypothesis (below) represents testing for one
component. For Hypotheses 4-7, an independent t-test was used to determine the difference
between the two groups (mandated or not). For Hypotheses 8-11, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was used to find the relationship between mandated partners’ perception of
collaboration that belong to the following sectors: private, public, or nonprofit for each
component. Hypotheses 12-15 used the same approach, but for non-mandated partners only.

3.3.2.1 - Hypothesis 4
H40: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than
mandated partners.
H4A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than
mandated partners.

3.3.2.2 - Hypothesis 5
H50: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness”
than mandated partners.
H5A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” than
mandated partners.
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3.3.2.3 - Hypothesis 6
H60: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than
mandated partners.
H6A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than
mandated partners.

3.3.2.4 - Hypothesis 7
H70: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than
mandated partners.
H7A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than
mandated partners.

3.3.2.5 - Hypothesis 8
H80: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H8A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

3.3.2.6 - Hypothesis 9
H90: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H9A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.
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3.3.2.7 - Hypothesis 10
H100: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H10A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

3.3.2.8 - Hypothesis 11
H110: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H11A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

3.3.2.9 - Hypotheses 12
H120: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for non-mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H12A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for non-mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

3.3.2.10 - Hypotheses 13
H130: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for non-mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H13A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
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3.3.2.11 - Hypothesis 14
H140: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H14A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for non-mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

3.3.2.12 - Hypothesis 15
H150: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H15A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for non-mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

3.4 - Summary of Hypotheses
Table 5 presents a summary of the 15 hypotheses and the corresponding statistical tests
that were performed. Table 6 shows the hypotheses and their relationship in diagrammatic form.

Table 5
Summary of Hypotheses and Statistical Tests
Hypotheses
H10
H1A

In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated
partners do not have a stronger perception of collaboration
than mandated partners.
In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated
partners do have a stronger perception of collaboration
than mandated partners.
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Statistical Test
Independent Samples
t-test

The following two hypotheses relate to collaboration from the private, public and nonprofit
sectors for mandated partners (H2) and non-mandated partners (H3).
H20
H2A
H30
H3A

The perception of collaboration is not different for
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit
sectors.
The perception of collaboration is different for mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of collaboration is not different for nonmandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit
sectors.
The perception of collaboration is different for nonmandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit
sectors.

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

The following four hypotheses (H4, H5, H6, H7) relate to the collaboration components derived
from principal components analysis and the differences in them between mandated and nonmandated partners.
H40
H4A
H50
H5A
H60
H6 A
H70
H7A

Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception
of” Partnership Capacity” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of”
Partnership Capacity” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception
of” Partnership Responsiveness” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of”
Partnership Responsiveness” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception
of “Partnership Legitimacy” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of
“Partnership Legitimacy” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception
of “Partnership Momentum” than mandated partners.
Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of
“Partnership Momentum” than mandated partners.

Independent Samples
t-test
Independent Samples
t-test

Independent Samples
t-test
Independent Samples
t-test

The following four hypotheses (H8, H9, H10, H11) relate to the collaboration components
derived from principal components analysis and the differences between only the mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H80

The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different
for mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.

43

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

H8A
H90
H9A
H100
H10A
H110
H11A

The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit
sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not
different for mandated partners from the private, public
and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is
different for mandated partners from the private, public
and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not
different for mandated partners from the private, public
and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different
for mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not
different for mandated partners from the private, public
and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different
for mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

The following four hypotheses (H12, H13, H14, H15) relate to the collaboration components
derived from principal components analysis and the differences between only the non-mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H120
H12A
H130
H13A
H140
H14A

The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different
for non-mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for
non-mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not
different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is
different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not
different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different
for non-mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.
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Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

H150

The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not
different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.

H15A

The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different
for non-mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors.

Figure 2
Path Diagram representing Hypotheses
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Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA)

3.5 - Limitations
This study only explored the perceptions of collaboration from regional workforce boards in
Virginia and was limited to the finite population of the 15 WDBs in Virginia. As a result,
applying the findings and making generalized conclusions to other populations and partnerships
should be done cautiously. The data in this study is self-reported data, therefore, answers from
survey respondents could be influenced by this. Additionally, this study was cross sectional, yet
it studied phenomena (collaboration, trust) that may evolve and change over time.
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Chapter 4: Study Results
4.1 - Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the principal components analysis along with the
survey response rate at an aggregate and partnership/board level, an overview of survey
demographics and the statistical results of the hypotheses testing. Because of the importance of
trust in this study, prior to hypotheses testing, two linear regressions were run; one for the two
questions on the survey representing “Mutual respect, understanding, and trust,” representing the
variable, “Trust” and one for the length of time served on the board, representing the variable,
“Time.” This was done in order to determine how much the dependent variable, “Perception of
Collaboration,” was explained by these variables. The “Time” variable explained only 1.2% of
the “Perception of Collaboration” with a significance of .230, and therefore was not further
explored. The variable “Trust” explained 55.30% of the “Perception of Collaboration,” with a
significance of .000. After this test, “Trust” was confirmed to be the most impactful variable.
The survey results section explains the other 44.7% of the “Perception of Collaboration” that was
not explained.

4.2 - Principal Components Analysis Results
Prior to performing the principal components analysis, the suitability of the data was
assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed that no variables were competing for
multicollinearity and therefore, all variables were retained. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy was .927, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2006) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance (𝜒 (231) = 1827.60, p
<.001), supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Finally, the communalities were all
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above .4, further confirming that each variable shared some common variance with other
variables. Given these indicators, the principle components analysis was conducted with all 22
variables.
The principle components analysis revealed the presence of four components with
eigenvalues exceeding 1, with Component 1 explaining 49.37%, Component 2 explaining 5.87%,
Component 3 explaining 5.31%, and Component 4 explaining 4.92% of the variance respectively
(Appendix H). An inspection of the scree plot (Appendix I) revealed a break after the fourth
component where Eigenvalues reached below 1.0. This confirmed the decision to retain four
components. Appendix J shows the unrotated loadings of the variables on the four components.
Rotation was used to improve the interpretability of the results and varimax rotation was
requested. The Rotated Component Matrix (Appendix K) revealed that all components had
positive loadings. Interpretation of the rotated factor loadings revealed four patterns of loadings.
Component 1 included 13 variables with components from .816 - .476: (1) Skilled Leadership
(.816); (2) Adaptability (.780); (3) Concrete and attainable goals (.735); (4) Evaluation and
continuous learning (.726); (5) Shared Vision (.721); (6) Open and frequent communication
(.687); (7) Mutual respect, understanding, and trust (.644); (8) Established informal relationships
and communication links (.637); (9) Appropriate pace of development (.605); (10) Engaged
stakeholders (.569); (11) Unique purpose (.539); (12) Development of clear roles and policy
guidelines (.498); and (13) Members share a stake in both process and outcome (476).
Component 1 was renamed to be “Partnership Capacity”.
Component 2 consisted of four variables clustered together from .847 - .497: (1) Multiple
layers of Participation (.847); (2) Flexibility (.582); (3) Appropriate cross section of members
(.563); and (4) Ability to compromise (.497). Component 2 was renamed to be “Partnership
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Responsiveness”. Component 3 consisted of two variables with component loadings between
.807 - .749: (1) Collaborative group seen as a legitimate leader in the community (.807); and (2)
History of collaboration or cooperation in the community (.749). Component 3 was renamed to
be “Partnership Legitimacy”. Component 4 consisted of three variables with component loadings
from .713 - .524: (1) Favorable political and social climate (.713); (2) Members see collaboration
as being in their self-interest (.709); and (3) Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time (.524).
Component 4 was renamed to “Partnership Momentum.”

4.3 - Survey Results
The following two sections outline the survey response rates and the demographic
characteristics of the survey respondents.

4.3.1 - Survey Distribution and Response Rates
Individuals were selected for participation if they were serving as a board member on at
least one of the 15 WDBs in Virginia. A total of 459 participants were reached through their
Executive Directors and asked to fill out the survey online. A total of 127 surveys were taken
(27.7%) and 3 surveys were excluded (N=124). One was excluded because the survey
respondent did not indicate which WDB they were serving on, but rather, filled out which
committee they were serving on for the WDB. The other two respondents were removed because
they did not fall into the primary variable categories of sector and mandatory/non-mandatory
participation status. One respondent indicated that they were a part of the private and public
sector. This may have occurred because some private sector representatives are also serving as a
publicly elected official. The survey was adjusted to allow survey respondents to enter multiple
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categories for participation in a sector, realizing that they could be a part of more than one sector.
This situation was presented during the pilot study; therefore, an adjustment was made to allow
multiple entries so that the respondent would not choose to avoid this question. The other
respondent answered that they did not know whether they were required to be on the board or
not. For one WDB, there were no respondents, therefore, only 14 WDBs were represented in the
survey. Five respondents did not completely fill out the survey, however, the responses for
questions that were answered were used in the data analysis. The survey distribution and
response rates are presented in Table 6.

Table 6
Survey Distribution and Response Rates
______________________________________________________________________________
WDB Name

Surveys
Distributed

Surveys
Completed

Response Rate
(%)

South Central
Greater Peninsula Region
Central Region
Alexandria/Arlington
Bay Consortium Region
Southwest Region
Crater Region
Shenandoah Valley Region
Piedmont Region
Capital Region
Hampton Roads Region
Northern Region
Blue Ridge Region
West Piedmont
New River/Mount Rogers Region

23
39
31
32
24
35
21
34
23
30
43
44
25
27
28

14
20
14
12
9
12
7
8
5
6
8
7
2
2
0

60.9
51.3
45.2
37.5
37.5
34.3
33.3
23.5
21.7
20.0
18.6
15.9
8.0
7.4
0.0

Total
459
126*
*127 surveys were completed, but 1 survey respondent did not identify their WDB
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27.7

4.3.2 - Survey Demographics
The majority of the survey respondents were from the public sector (37.8%), have served
on the board for 49 or more months (37.8%) and indicated that they were not required to be on
the board (78.7%). The second highest sector to respond was the private sector (33.9%). The
second highest response for time served on the board was 25-48 months. Demographic
characteristics of survey respondents are presented in Table 7.

Table 7
Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents
Sector

Frequency

Percent (%)

43
48
35
1

33.9
37.8
27.6
0.8

Total

127

100.0

Time Served on the Board
0-12 months
13-24 months
25-48 months
49+ months

20
24
35
48

15.7
18.9
27.6
37.8

Total

127

100.0

Required to be on the Board
Yes
No
I don’t know

26
100
1

20.5
78.7
0.8

Total

127

100.0

Private Sector
Public Sector
Nonprofit Sector
Private & Public Sector
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After removing the three survey respondents, (N = 124), 26 respondents (21%) reported
that they were required to be on the board and 98 (79%) reported that they were not. The
frequency for the sectors was as follows: private sector - 42 (33.9%); public sector - 48 (38.7%);
and the nonprofit sector - 34 (27.4%). The frequency for time served on the board was as
follows: 0-12 months – 19 (23.6%); 13-24 months – 24 (29.8%); 25-48 months – 33 (40.9%);
and 49+ months – 48 (59.5%).

4.4 - Results for Research Question and Hypotheses
The results of this study are reported for the state of Virginia as a whole, and not by
individual partnership/board. There were two research questions guiding this study. They relate
to the perception of collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners at aggregate and
disaggregate levels. These and the ensuing hypotheses are explained below.

4.4.1 - Research Question 1
At an aggregate level, are there differences in the perception of collaboration between mandated
and non-mandated partners? Three hypotheses were tested.

4.4.1.1 - Hypothesis 1
H10: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do not have a stronger
perception of collaboration than mandated partners.
H1A: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners have a stronger perception
of collaboration than mandated partners.

52

Results
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the mean for mandated
partners differed significantly compared to the mean for non-mandated partners. The assumption
of homogeneity of variance was assessed by the Levene test, F = .549, p = .460; this indicated no
significant violation of the equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed
version of the t test was used. The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = .23, p = .818, onetailed. However, the mandated partners mean (M = .095, SD = 1.681) was 0.1 higher than the
non-mandated partners mean (M = -.007, SD = 2.086). Therefore, the null hypothesis was
accepted, and the alternative hypothesis was rejected. Table 8 details the results.

Table 8
Independent t-test for Mandated/Non-mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

df

t

Sig.

Mandated Partners

26

.095

1.681

122

.230

.818

Non-mandated
Partners

98

-.007

2.086

122

.230

.818

4.4.1.2 - Hypothesis 2
H20: The perception of collaboration is not different for mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
H2A: The perception of collaboration is different for mandated partners from the private, public
and nonprofit sectors.
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Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between mandated partners that belonged to one of the following sectors: private, public, or
nonprofit. Prior to the analysis, the Levene test for homogeneity of variance was used to examine
if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no
significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .127, p = .881. The mandated private sector mean (M
= .940, SD = 1.603) was 0.921 higher than the mandated public sector mean (M = .019, SD =
1.818) and 1.052 higher than the nonprofit mean (M = -.112, SD = 1.424). The mandated public
sector mean was 0.131 higher than the mandated nonprofit sector mean. There was a difference
between group means as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .421, p = .661 (p <
.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted.
Table 9 details the results.

Table 9
One-way ANOVA for Mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration by Sector

Mean

Private Sector

.940

Public Sector

.019

Nonprofit Sector

-.112

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

2.498

25

1.249

.421

.661
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4.4.1.3 - Hypothesis 3
H30: The perception of collaboration is not different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.
H3A: The perception of collaboration is different for non-mandated partners from the private,
public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between non-mandated partners that belonged to one of the following sectors: private, public, or
nonprofit. Prior to the analysis, the Levene test for homogeneity of variance was used to examine
if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no
significant violation was found: F(2,95) = .269, p = .765. The non-mandated private sector mean
(M = -.493, SD = 2.380) was 0.700 lower than the non-mandated public sector mean (M = .206,
SD = 1.962) and .927 lower than the nonprofit mean (M = .434, SD = 1.669). The non-mandated
public sector mean was .228 lower than the non-mandated nonprofit sector mean. There was a
difference between group means as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = 1.881, p =
.158 (p < .05). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was
accepted. Table 10 details the results.
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Table 10
One-way ANOVA for Non-mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration by Sector

Mean

Private Sector

-.493

Public Sector

.206

Nonprofit Sector

.434

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

16.075

97

8.037

F
1.881

Sig.
.158

Hypotheses 1-3 were related to research question 1. The first hypothesis that nonmandated partners had a stronger perception of collaboration than mandated partners was not
supported. However, the mean difference between the mandated and non-mandated partners was
only .102. Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the
study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population.
Hypothesis 2 speculated that there was a difference in collaboration between the sectors
for mandated partners and that hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 3 speculated that there was
a difference in collaboration between the sectors for non-mandated partners and that hypothesis
also was supported. The highest difference of 1.052 was between the private and nonprofit
sectors. The difference between the private and public sectors was .921 and .013 for the public
and nonprofit sectors. Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning
since the study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a
population
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Hypothesis 3 speculated that there was also a difference in collaboration between the
sectors for non-mandated partners and that hypothesis was supported. The greatest difference of
.927 was between the private and nonprofit sectors. The difference between the nonprofit and
public sectors was .228 and the difference between the public and private sectors was .699.
Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the study was
conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population.
In summary, mandated partners had a stronger perception of collaboration than nonmandated partners, but only slightly more. This contradicts the literature. There was a greater
difference between mandated partners and non-mandated partners with regard to sector. The
nonprofit and public sectors had a stronger perception of collaboration for the non-mandated
partners group and the private sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for the mandated
partners group.
One interesting finding is that the private sector had the strongest perception of
collaboration for the mandated partners and the weakest perception of collaboration for the nonmandated partners. The public sector’s survey results were more similar for both mandated and
non-mandated partners. The nonprofit sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for nonmandated partners and a weaker perception of collaboration for mandated partners. The biggest
difference was between the private sector and then the nonprofit sectors, with a marginal
difference for the public sector, overall.
The nonprofit sector was also the opposite and had a stronger perception of collaboration
for the non-mandated partners and a weaker perception of collaboration for the mandated
partners. Table 11 summarizes by sector who (mandated or non-mandated partners) had the
strongest or weakest perception of collaboration.
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Table 11
Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration for Mandated and Non-Mandated Partners
by Sector
Sector

Strongest Perception of Collaboration

Weakest Perception of Collaboration

Private

Mandated Partners

Non-Mandated Partners

Public

Non-Mandated Partners

Mandated Partners

Nonprofit

Non-Mandated Partners

Mandated Partners

4.4.2 - Results for Research Question 2
The second research question continues the same analysis but after separating
collaboration into four component parts using principal component analysis. The components
are: (1) “Partnership Capacity,” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness,” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy,”
and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” Each hypothesis (below) represents testing for one
component. For Hypotheses 4-7, an independent t-test was used to determine the difference
between the two groups (mandated or not). For Hypotheses 8-11, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was used to find the relationship between mandated partners’ perception of
collaboration that belong to the following sectors: private, public, or nonprofit for each
component. Hypotheses 12-15 used a similar approach, but for non-mandated partners.
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4.4.2.1 - Hypothesis 4
H40: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than
mandated partners.
H4A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than
mandated partners.

Results
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by
principal components analysis differed significantly compared to the means for non-mandated
partners. For Component 1, “Partnership Capacity,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance
was assessed by the Levene test, F = 1.119, p = .292; this indicated no significant violation of the
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used.
The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = -.265, p = .792, one-tailed. Yet, the mandated
partners mean (M = -.033, SD = .828) was 0.058 lower than the non-mandated partners mean (M
= .025, SD = 1.046), therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis
was accepted. Table 12 details the results.

4.4.2.2 - Hypothesis 5
H50: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness”
than mandated partners.
H5A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” than
mandated partners.
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Results
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by
principal components analysis differed compared to the means for non-mandated partners. For
Component 2, “Partnership Responsiveness,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance was
assessed by the Levene test, F = .179, p = .673; this indicated no significant violation of the
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used.
The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = -1.053, p = .295, one-tailed. Yet, the mandated
partners mean (M = -.187, SD = .993) was .233 lower than the non-mandated partners mean (M =
.047 SD = 1.01), therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was
accepted. Table 12 details the results.

4.4.2.3 - Hypothesis 6
H60: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than
mandated partners.
H6A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than
mandated partners.

Results
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by
principal components analysis differed compared to the means for non-mandated partners. For
Component 3, “Partnership Legitimacy,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance was
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assessed by the Levene test, F = 3.564, p = .061; this indicated no significant violation of the
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used.
The means did differ significantly, t (122) = 2.137, p = .035, one-tailed. The mandated partners
mean (M = .374, SD = .700) was 0.470 higher than the non-mandated partners mean (M = -.094,
SD = 1.055).), therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted, and the alternative hypothesis was
rejected. Table 12 details the results.

4.4.2.4 - Hypothesis 7
H70: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than
mandated partners.
H7A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than
mandated partners.

Results
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by
principal components analysis differed compared to the means for non-mandated partners. For
Component 4, “Partnership Momentum,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance was
assessed by the Levene test, F = .005, p = .942; this indicated no significant violation of the
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used.
The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = -.331, p = .741, one-tailed. Yet, the mandated
partners mean (M = -.059, SD = .100) was .074 lower than the non-mandated partners mean (M =
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.014, SD = 1.009). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis
was accepted. Table 12 details the results.

Table 12
Independent t-test for Mandated/Non-mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration using
Components produced from Principal Components Analysis
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

df

t

Sig.

Component 1
“Partnership Capacity”
Mandated Partners

26

-0.334

.828

122

-.265

.792

Component 1
“Partnership Capacity”
Non-mandated Partners

98

.025

1.046

122

-.265

.792

26

-.187

.993

122

-1.053

.295

98

.0471

1.010

122

-1.053

295

Component 3
“Partnership Legitimacy”
Mandated Partners

26

.374

.700

122

2.137

.035*

Component 3
“Partnership Legitimacy”
Non-mandated Partners

98

-.094

1.055

122

2.137

.035*

Component 2
“Partnership
Responsiveness”
Mandated Partners
Component 2
“Partnership
Responsiveness”
Non-mandated Partners

.
Component 4
“Partnership Momentum”
Mandated Partners

26

-.0591

62

.999

122

-.331

741

Component 4
“Partnership Momentum”
Non-mandated Partners

98

.0144

1.009

122

-.331

.741

*denotes statistical significance p < .05

For Hypotheses 4-7, the only significant result of the four components, was for
Hypothesis 6 relating to “Partnership Legitimacy,” with a mean difference of .468. Although the
means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the study was conducted with a
finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population.
After “Partnership Legitimacy,” the next biggest difference between mandated and nonmandated partners was for “Partnership Responsiveness” with a mean difference of .234, then
“Partnership Momentum,” with a mean difference of .073 and finally, “Partnership Capacity,”
with a mean difference of .058. For Hypotheses 4-7, non-mandated partners had a stronger
perception of collaboration for all components, except “Partnership Legitimacy,” This was for
the most part, expected, based on the literature for mandated and non-mandated partners.

The following four hypotheses pertain to mandated partners only.

4.4.2.5 - Hypothesis 8
H80: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H8A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

63

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit. For Component 1, “Partnership Capacity,” the Levene test for
homogeneity of variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the
homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found:
F(2,23) = 1.306, p = .290. There was no statistically significant difference between group means
for “Partnership Capacity” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .585, p = .565 (p
< .05). However, the private sector mean (M = -.523, SD = 1.38) was .536 lower than the public
sector mean (M = .014 SD = .666) and 0.600 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .078 SD
= 1.39). The nonprofit sector was .064 higher than the public sector. Therefore, the null
hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results.

4.4.2.6 - Hypothesis 9
H90: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H9A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
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determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit.
For Component 2, “Partnership Responsiveness,” the Levene test for homogeneity of
variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance
assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .857, p = .857. There
was no statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership
Responsiveness” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .714, p = .500 (p < .05).
However, the private sector mean (M = .333, SD = .919) was .500 higher than the public sector
mean (M = -.165 SD = 1.026) and .840 higher than the nonprofit sector mean (M = -.509 SD =
.967). The public sector was .344 higher than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results.

4.4.2.7 - Hypothesis 10
H100: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H10A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit.
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For Component 3, “Partnership Legitimacy,” the Levene test for homogeneity of variance
was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption
across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .166, p = .848. There was no
statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership Legitimacy” as
determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .878, p = .429 (p < .05). However, the private
sector mean (M = .240, SD = .798) was .040 lower than the public sector mean (M = .280 SD =
.622) and .466 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .707 SD = .885). The nonprofit sector
was .430 higher than the public sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the
alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results.

4.4.2.8 - Hypothesis 11
H110: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H11A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit.
For Component 4, “Partnership Momentum,” the Levene test for homogeneity of
variance was used to examine where there were serious violations of the homogeneity of
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variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .581, p =
.568. There was no statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership
Momentum” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = 1.809, p = .186 (p < .05).
However, the private sector mean (M = .889, SD = .461) was .100 higher than the public sector
mean (M = -.110 SD = .1.025) and 1.277 higher than the nonprofit sector mean (M = -.388 SD =
.927). The public sector was .277 higher than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results.

Table 13
One-way ANOVA Mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration using Components produced
from Principal Components Analysis
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

df

F

Sig.

Mandated Private Sector

3

-.523

1.384

25

.585

.565

Mandated Public Sector

17

.014

.666

25

.585

.565

Mandated Nonprofit Sector

6

.078

1.037

25

.585

.565

Mandated Private Sector

3

.333

.919

25

.714

.500

Mandated Public Sector

17

-.165

1.03

25

.714

.500

Mandated Nonprofit Sector

6

-.509

.967

25

.714

.500

3

.240

.798

25

.878

.429

Component 1 “Partnership Capacity”

Component 2 “Partnership Responsiveness”

Component 3 “Partnership Legitimacy”
Mandated Private Sector
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Mandated Public Sector

17

.280

.622

25

.878

.429

Mandated Nonprofit Sector

6

.707

.885

25

.878

.429

Mandated Private Sector

3

.889

.461

25 1.809

.186

Mandated Public Sector

17

-.110

1.025

25 1.809

.186

Mandated Nonprofit Sector

6

-.388

.927

25 1.809

.186

Component 4 “Partnership Momentum”

Hypotheses 8-11 evaluated the four collaboration components for mandated partners
only. For the nonprofit sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership
Legitimacy,” and the weakest perception was for “Partnership Momentum.” For the private
sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Momentum,” and the
weakest perception was for “Partnership Capacity.” For the public sector, the strongest
perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Legitimacy” and the weakest perception was for
“Partnership Responsiveness.” The private and nonprofit sectors had the stronger or weaker
perceptions of collaboration for each component. The greatest difference, (1.217), was observed
for “Partnership Momentum,” and was between the private and nonprofit sectors. “Partnership
Momentum,” flipped for the private and nonprofit sectors in order of the strongest and weakest
perception of collaboration. The private sector had the strongest perception of collaboration of
the mandated partners, yet the weakest for the non-mandated partners. The nonprofit sector had
the strongest perception of collaboration of the non-mandated partners, yet the weakest for the
mandated partners.
The next largest difference (.842) was observed for “Partnership Responsiveness,” and
then “Partnership Capacity,” (.601), followed by “Partnership Legitimacy,” (.467), all between
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the nonprofit and private sectors. Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have
meaning since the study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled
from a population
In summary, “Partnership Momentum” had the largest overall difference. The private and
nonprofit sectors had the strongest perception of collaboration for the mandated partners. The
public sector was in between for all four components. For all components, the private and
nonprofit sectors had the biggest differences. Table 14 provides a summary.

Table 14
Comparison of Collaboration Components for Mandated Partners
“Partnership Capacity”

“Partnership Responsiveness”

“Partnership Legitimacy”

“Partnership Momentum”

Nonprofit Sector
(M = .078);

Private Sector
(M = .333);

Nonprofit Sector
(M = .707);

Private Sector
(M = .889);

Difference: .064

Difference: .498

Difference: .427

Difference: .999

Public Sector
(M = .014);

Public Sector
(M = -.165);

Public Sector
(M = .280);

Public Sector
(M = -.110);

Difference: .537

Difference: .344

Difference: .04

Difference: .278

Private Sector
(M = -.523)

Nonprofit Sector
(M = -.509)

Private Sector
(M = .240)

Nonprofit Sector
(M = -.388)

Overall Difference: .601
(H8)

Overall Difference: .842
(H9)

Overall Difference: .467
(H10)

Overall Difference: 1.217
(H11)
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The following four hypotheses pertain to non-mandated partners only.

4.4.2.9 - Hypothesis 12
H120: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for non-mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H12A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for non-mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit. For Component 1, “Partnership Capacity,” the Levene test for
homogeneity of variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the
homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found:
F(2,95) = 2.800 p = .066. There was no statistically significant difference between group means
for “Partnership Capacity” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = .432, p = .650 (p
< .05). Yet, the private sector mean (M = -.091, SD = 1.371) was .160 lower than the public
sector mean (M = .069 SD = .747) and .231 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .140 SD =
.796). The public sector was .007 lower than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 15 details the results.

70

4.4.2.10 - Hypothesis 13
H130: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for non-mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H13A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit.
For Component 2, “Partnership Responsiveness,” the Levene test for homogeneity of
variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance
assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,95) = .552, p = .578. There
was no statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership
Responsiveness” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = .411, p = .664 (p < .05).
Yet, the private sector mean (M = .153, SD = 1.110) was .220 higher than the public sector mean
(M = -.067 SD = 1.033) and .127 higher than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .026 SD = .846).
The public sector was .093 lower than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis was
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 15 details the results.
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4.4.2.11 - Hypothesis 14
H140: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H14A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for non-mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit.
For Component 3, “Partnership Legitimacy,” the Levene test for homogeneity of variance
was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption
across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,95) = 1.920, p = .152. There was no
statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership Legitimacy” as
determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = .315, p = .730 (p < .05). Yet, the private sector
mean (M = -.197, SD = 1.25) was .189 lower than the public sector mean
(M = -.008 SD = .976) and .151 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = -.046 SD = .846). The
nonprofit sector was .038 lower than the public sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis was
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 15 details the results.
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4.4.2.12 - Hypothesis 15
H150: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
H15A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for non-mandated partners from
the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Results
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups:
private, public or nonprofit.
For Component 4, “Partnership Momentum,” the Levene test for homogeneity of
variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance
assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,95) = 1.235, p = .295. The
private sector mean (M = -.357, SD = .950) was .569 lower than the public sector mean (M =
.212 SD = 1.124) and .671 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .314 SD = .803). The
public sector was .102 lower than the nonprofit sector. There was a statistically significant
difference between group means for “Partnership Momentum” as determined by the one-way
ANOVA, F (2,95) = 4.826, p = .010 (p < .05). Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the
alternative hypothesis is accepted. Table 15 details the results.
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Table 15
One-way ANOVA Non-Mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration using Components
produced from Principal Components Analysis
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

df

F

Sig.

Non-mandated Private Sector

39

-.091

1.371

97

.432

.650

Non-mandated Public Sector

31

.069

.069

97

.432

.650

Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector

28

.140

.140

97

.432

.650

Non-mandated Private Sector

39

.153

1.11

97

.411

.664

Non-mandated Public Sector

31

-.067

1.03

97

.411

.664

Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector

28

.026

.846

97

.411

.664

Non-mandated Private Sector

39

-.197

1.250

97

.315

.730

Non-mandated Public Sector

31

-.008

.976

97

.315

.730

Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector

28

-.046

.846

97

.315

.730

Non-mandated Private Sector

39

-.357

.950

97 4.826 .010*

Non-mandated Public Sector

31

.212

1.124

97 4.826 .010*

Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector

28

.314

.803

97 4.826 .010*

Component 1 “Partnership Capacity”

Component 2 “Partnership Responsiveness”

Component 3 “Partnership Legitimacy”

Component 4 “Partnership Momentum”

*denotes statistical significance p < .05
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Hypotheses 12 -15 evaluated the four components of collaboration for non-mandated
partners only. For the nonprofit sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for
“Partnership Momentum,” and the weakest perception was for “Partnership Legitimacy.” For the
private sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Responsiveness,”
and the weakest perception was for “Partnership Momentum.” For the public sector, the
strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Momentum” and the weakest
perception was for “Partnership Responsiveness.” The largest difference, (.671), was observed
for “Partnership Momentum.” “Partnership Momentum” had the greatest difference with the
private sector and was significantly different from the nonprofit and public sectors. The next
largest difference, (.231), was observed for “Partnership Capacity,” also between the private and
nonprofit sectors. For the two components, “Partnership Legitimacy,” and “Partnership
Responsiveness,” the greatest difference was between the public and private sectors. Although
these latter means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the study is was
conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population.
Overall, there was a greater difference in perception of collaboration, by collaboration
components between mandated partners and non-mandated partners with regard to sector. The
following were observed:


The nonprofit and public sectors had a stronger perception of collaboration for the nonmandated partners, with the nonprofit sector having the strongest overall. The private
sector and the public sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for the mandated
partners, with the private sector having the strongest overall.



For both mandated and non-mandated partners, there was a greater difference of the
perception of collaboration between the private and nonprofit sectors, followed by the
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next greatest difference between the private and public sectors, and then the public and
nonprofit sectors.


The private sector had the strongest perception of collaboration for the mandated partners
group, and a much lower perception for the non-mandated partners group. The public
sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for the mandated partner group, but not
much more. The nonprofit partner group had much stronger perception of collaboration
then the non-mandated partner group.



The strongest and weakest perceptions of collaboration, overall, for the public and
nonprofit sectors were on the mandated side.



The private sector had the strongest perception of collaboration for “Partnership
Responsiveness” for both the mandated and non-mandated partner groups. The private
sector had the weakest perception of collaboration for “Partnership Legitimacy” for both
the mandated and non-mandated partners.



For the mandated partners, the public and nonprofit sectors ranked the four collaboration
components in the same order.



For the non-mandated partners, the public and nonprofit sectors had stronger perceptions
of collaboration for “Partnership Momentum,” and “Partnerships Capacity.” The private
sector had the weakest perception of collaboration for “Partnership Momentum.”

Additionally, mandated and non-mandated partners, individually, had similarities with regard
to the four components of collaboration, but when the mandated and non-mandated partners were
compared by sector, there were greater differences. When comparing the mandated and nonmandated partners by sector, both the mandated and non-mandated groups, individually, had the
greatest difference for “Partnership Momentum” and the least amount of difference for
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“Partnership Legitimacy.” The greatest difference between the mandated and non-mandated
partners, overall, was for “Partnership Legitimacy” and “Partnership Responsiveness.” This was
followed by “Partnership Momentum,” and lastly, “Partnership Capacity”. When comparing
mandated and non-mandated partners, the strongest and weakest perception of collaboration for
each sector was not the same for any of the components. The biggest differences by sector
between mandated and nonmandated partner groups were in the following order:


Nonprofit Sector– “Partnership Legitimacy, Momentum, Responsiveness, Capacity”



Public Sector– “Partnership Momentum, Legitimacy, Responsiveness, Capacity”



Private Sector– “Partnership Momentum, Legitimacy, Capacity, Responsiveness”

Table 16 provides a summary.

Table 16
Comparison of Collaboration Components for Non-mandated Partners
“Partnership Capacity”

“Partnership Responsiveness”

“Partnership Legitimacy”

“Partnership Momentum”

Nonprofit Sector
(M = .140);

Private Sector
(M = .153);

Public Sector
(M = -.008);

Nonprofit Sector
(M = .314);

Difference: .071

Difference: .127

Difference: .038

Difference: .102

Public Sector
(M = .069);

Nonprofit Sector
(M = .026);

Nonprofit Sector
(M = -.046);

Public Sector
(M = .212);

Difference: .160

Difference: .093

Difference: .150

Difference: .569

Private Sector
(M = -.091)

Public Sector
(M = -.067)

Private Sector
(M = -.197)

Private Sector
(M = -.357)

Overall Difference: .231
(H8)

Overall Difference: .220
(H9)

Overall Difference: .189
(H10)

Overall Difference: .671
(H11)
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The following two tables summarize the strongest and weakest perception of
collaboration for each sector for mandated and non-mandated partners.

Table 17
Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration for Mandated Partners
Sector

Strongest Perception of Collaboration Weakest Perception of Collaboration

Private

“Partnership Momentum”

“Partnership Capacity”

Public

“Partnership Legitimacy”

“Partnership Responsiveness”

Nonprofit

“Partnership Legitimacy”

“Partnership Momentum”

Table 18
Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration for Non-mandated Partners
Sector

Strongest Perception of Collaboration

Weakest Perception of Collaboration

Private

“Partnership Responsiveness”

“Partnership Momentum”

Public

“Partnership Momentum”

“Partnership Responsiveness”

Nonprofit

“Partnership Momentum”

“Partnership Legitimacy”

Another way to look at the differences in perception of collaboration is to compare each
sector from the mandated and the non-mandated groups. Table 19 details the results.
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Table 19
Comparison of Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration by Component
Mandated Partners

Non-mandated Partners

Strongest

Weakest

Strongest

Weakest

“Partnership Capacity”

Nonprofit
Sector

Private Sector

Nonprofit
Sector

Private Sector

“Partnership Responsiveness”

Private Sector

Nonprofit
Sector

Private Sector

Public Sector

“Partnership Legitimacy”

Nonprofit
Sector

Private Sector

Public Sector

Private Sector

“Partnership Momentum”

Private Sector

Nonprofit
Sector

Nonprofit
Sector

Private Sector

For the mandated group, the private and nonprofit sectors had the strongest or weakest
collaboration for each component. The next largest difference after “Partnership Momentum”
was observed for “Partnership Responsiveness,” and then “Partnership Capacity,” followed by
“Partnership Legitimacy.”
For the non-mandated group, after “Partnership Momentum,” the next largest difference
was observed for “Partnership Capacity,” also between the private and nonprofit sectors. An
interesting result was that for the mandated partners, the public and nonprofit sectors ranked the
four collaboration components in the same order.
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4.5 - Significance of Trust
The variable “Trust” was used to determine if there was a difference in the perception of
trust between mandated and non-mandated partners. The significance of trust was tested by
determining the correlation of “Trust” to the four collaboration components produced from the
principle components analysis: (1) “Partnership Capacity,” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness,” (3)
“Partnership Legitimacy,” and (4) “Partnership Momentum.”

4.5.1 - Trust of Mandated and Non-Mandated Partners
In order to know the significance of trust, an independent t-test was conducted to
determine which group (mandated or non-mandated partners) had a stronger perception of trust.
The two questions on the survey representing “Mutual respect, understanding, and trust”
represented the variable “Trust.” The assumption of homogeneity of variance was assessed by
the Levene test, F = .276, p = .601; this indicated no significant violation of the equal variance
assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used. The means did
not differ significantly, t (122) = -1.066, p = .289, two-tailed. However, the non-mandated
partners mean (M = 8.143, SD = 1.429) was 0.1 higher than the mandated partners mean (M =
7.801, SD = 1.415). Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning
since the study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a
population. There was a stronger perception of trust for the non-mandated partners. Table 20
details the results.
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Table 20
Independent t-test for Trust with Mandated/Non-mandated Partners

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

df

t

Sig.

Mandated Partners

26

7.801

1.415

122

-1.066

.289

Non-mandated
Partners

98

8.143

1.429

122

-1.066

.289

4.5.2 - Correlation of Trust and Collaboration
The variable “Trust” was tested for correlation to the four collaboration components
produced from the principle components analysis: (1) “Partnership Capacity,” (2) “Partnership
Responsiveness,” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy,” and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” In order to
analyze “Trust” with the overall “Perception of Collaboration,” a correlation analysis was run to
produce a correlation coefficients matrix for the variable “Trust,” the four components (named
above) and the “Perception of Collaboration.” “Trust” was correlated the highest to the overall
“Perception of Collaboration” and then to Component 1, “Partnership Capacity.” The lowest
correlations to the four components was for “Partnership Legitimacy,” and “Partnership
Momentum.” The correlation matrix is presented in Table 21.
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Table 21
Correlation Matrix for Trust, Collaboration Components and the Perception of Collaboration
Correlation to Trust
Component 1: “Partnership Capacity”

.644**

Component 2: “Partnership Responsiveness”

.414**

Component 3: “Partnership Legitimacy”

.224*

Component 4: “Partnership Momentum”

.202*

Perception of Collaboration (PC)

.744**

**denotes statistical significance p < .01; *denotes statistical significance p < .05

4.6 - Summary of Hypotheses Testing and Results
After hypotheses testing, there was support for 13 hypotheses and no support for two
hypotheses. Tables 19 -21 show a summary of the hypotheses testing and whether there was
support or not. Of the tests, only hypotheses 6 and 15 had statistically significant results. While
the differences between the means of the other hypotheses are not statistically significant, they
are nevertheless salient because they are differences between population means (as opposed to
sample means).
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Table 22
Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypotheses
H1A

Results

In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do
have a stronger perception of collaboration than mandated partners.

*Denotes
Significant
Result

No Support

Mandated (M = .095); Non-mandated (M = -.007)
The following two hypotheses relate to collaboration from the private, public and nonprofit sectors for
mandated partners (H2) and non-mandated partners (H3).
H2A

The perception of collaboration is different for mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Private (M = .940); Public (M = .019); Nonprofit (M = -.112)
H3A

The perception of collaboration is different for non-mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Nonprofit (M = .434); Public (M = .206); Private (M = -.493)
The following four hypotheses (H4, H5, H6, H7) relate to the collaboration components derived from
principal components analysis and the differences in them between mandated and non-mandated
partners.
H4A

Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership
Capacity” than mandated partners.

Support

Non-mandated (M = .025); Mandated (M = -.033)
H5A

Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership
Responsiveness” than mandated partners.

Support

Non-mandated (M = .047); Mandated (M = -.187)
H6 A

Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership
Legitimacy” than mandated partners.
Mandated (M = .374); Non-mandated (M = -.094)
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No Support

*

H7A

Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership
Momentum” than mandated partners.

Support

Non-mandated (M =.014); Mandated (M = -.059)
The following four hypotheses (H8, H9, H10, H11) relate to the collaboration components derived from
principal components analysis and for the differences in them between mandated partners from the
private, public and nonprofit sectors only.
H8A

The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for mandated
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Nonprofit (M = .078); Public (M = .014); Private (M = -.523)
H9A

The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Private (M = .333); Public (M = -.165); Nonprofit (M = -.509)
H10A

The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Nonprofit (M = .707); Public (M = .280); Private (M = .240)
H11A The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Private (M = .889); Public (M = -.110); Nonprofit (M = -.388)
The following four hypotheses (H12, H13, H14, H15) relate to the collaboration components derived
from principal components analysis and for the differences in them between non-mandated partners
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors only.
H12A The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for nonmandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Nonprofit (M = .140); Public (M = .069); Private (M = -.091)
H13A The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for nonmandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.
Private (M = .153); Nonprofit (M = .026); Public (M = -.067)
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Support

H14A The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for nonmandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

Public (M = -.008); Nonprofit (M = -.046); Private (M = -.197)
H15A The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for nonmandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.

Support

*

Nonprofit (M = .314); Public (M = .212); Private (M = -.357)
Note: The strongest perception of collaboration is in boldface and means are arranged in order
from highest to lowest.

The following table is a visual representation of the results represented as means and their
corresponding hypotheses.
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Table 23
Summary of Overall Results
Par.
Status

Capacity

Responsiveness

Legitimacy

Momentum

Par.
Status and
Sector

Capacity

Responsiveness

Legitimacy

Momentum

Mandated
Partners
(M = .095)

Mandated
(M = -.033)

Mandated
(M =-.187)

Mandated
(M =.374)

Mandated
(M =-.059)

Private
Sector
(M = .940);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = .078);

Private
Sector
(M = .333);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = .707);

Private
Sector
(M = .889);

Public
Sector
(M = .019);

Public
Sector
(M = .014);

Public
Sector
(M = -.165);

Public
Sector
(M = .280);

Public
Sector
(M = -.110);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = -.112)

Private
Sector
(M = -.523)

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = -.509)

Private
Sector
(M = .240)

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = -.388)

(H1)

(H4)

(H5)

(H6)*

(H7)

(H2)

(H8)

(H9)

(H10)

(H11)

Nonmandated
Partners
(M = -.007)

Nonmandated
(M = .025)

Nonmandated
(M = .047);

Nonmandated
(M =-.094)

Nonmandated
(M =.014);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = .434);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = .140);

Private
Sector
(M = .153);

Public
Sector
(M = -.008);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = .314);

Public
Sector
(M = .206);

Public
Sector
(M = .069);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = .026);

Nonprofit
Sector
(M = -.046)

Public
Sector
(M = .212);

Private
Sector
(M = -.493)

Private
Sector
(M = -.091)

Public
Sector
(M = -.067)

Private
Sector
(M = -.197);

Private
Sector
(M = -.357)

(H3)

(H12)

(H13)

(H14)

(H15)*

Denotes Statistically Significant *
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Recommendations

5.1 - Introduction
Cross-sector partnerships that combine the perspectives and needs of public, private, and
nonprofit sectors have been used to address public policy challenges. These partnerships, whether
mandated or volitional, are formed in response to issues that no individual partner or sector can
address effectively on its own and each sector provides unique contributions to the partnership.
Yet, lacking effective collaboration, cross-sector partnerships can failure. Some of these
partnerships, particularly regional partnerships, are riddled with challenges to collaboration, such
as competition fueled by scare and sometimes declining public resources, lack of goal congruity,
and trust concerns. These challenges can fuel conflict because cross-sector partnerships tend to
create and enforce silos because of the inherent differences in the partners. This is further
complicated by the complexities that are presented when partners are mandated to be a part of a
partnership.
Research has shown that trust and reputation among partners play an important role in the
performance of partnerships. Trust between partners is a measure of the strength, durability, and
ultimately, the efficiency and effectiveness of these relationships. Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) theory allows us to understand the transactions within these partnerships and provides a
mechanism to rigorously address such factors as trust. However, it is not clear what happens to
trust when partnerships are required by government policy. Trust reduces transaction costs and
therefore, this study used a TCE approach as its theoretical framework. Although other studies
have used a TCE framework, the application of TCE theory to mandated and non-mandated
partners in cross-sector partnerships remains less well explored. Additionally, there is little
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research about linkages between the private, public and nonprofit sectors when they partner
together, particularly in partnerships that are not voluntary in nature.
This study sought to determine if collaboration was perceived differently for mandated
partnerships that had volitional and non-volitional (mandated) partners and if these perceptions of
collaboration were also affected by the partners’ sector identity. For instance, will collaboration
and trust be more likely to be positively perceived when partners are mandated or when they are
volitional? And how does this perceived collaboration affect transaction costs and ultimately, the
success of these partnerships? To answer these questions, this study used a non-experimental,
quantitative research design and was cross-sectional.
The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory, a collaboration survey, was sent to a defined
population of the 15 Governor-certified workforce board members across Virginia, as mandated
to exist by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA). The survey contained
questions related to 22 factors (variables) that influence the success of collaboration. The
expectation was that non-mandated partners would have a stronger perception of collaboration
than mandated partners. Additionally, it was hypothesized that partners from different sectors
would perceive collaboration differently.

5.2 - Summary and Discussion of Results
The research questions in this study sought to determine whether collaboration was
perceived differently for cross-sector partnerships that had volitional and non-volitional
(mandated) partners and if perceptions of collaboration were different when collaboration was
disaggregated into components. From the study results, both research questions were answered
and overall, 13 of the 15 hypotheses were supported. The findings in this study are consistent
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with the literature on the importance of trust and collaboration. The results confirmed that the
perception of collaboration differs when partnerships have mandated partners. Contrary to the
literature, mandated partners had a slightly stronger perception of collaboration than nonmandated ones, something that was traced to the sectoral origins of the partners. This was
surprising based on expectations that trust would be stronger in the case of non-mandated
partners. This underscored the importance of analyzing partnerships by sector rather than just as
an aggregate.
Also, it was determined that the length of time served on the board, or the “Time”
variable only explained a small portion (1.2%) of the “Perception of Collaboration.” This was a
little surprising, considering that the literature supports that trust is normally built over time. The
variable “Trust” explained 55.3% of the “Perception of Collaboration,” and this indicated that
“Trust” explained more than “Time” in this study.
Furthermore, in this study, other important conclusions were made about the complex
nature of cross-sector partnerships, particularly with mandated and non-mandated partners and
the differences in the perception of collaboration that result from them. Further disaggregation
was obtained by dissecting collaboration into four components. All four components: (1)
“Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy:” and (4)
“Partnership Momentum” were perceived differently and for all components except “Partnership
Legitimacy,” the non-mandated partners perceived collaboration more strongly. As nonmandated partners were hypothesized to have a stronger perception of collaboration overall, this
was expected based on the collaboration partnership literature. Nor was this surprising because
trust was perceived to be stronger by the non-mandated partners earlier in the study. This
indicates the importance of analyzing components of collaboration within cross-sector

89

partnerships in order to better determine how transaction costs may be affected. Clearly a
disaggregated and deeper analysis provided more insight than just observing collaboration as a
whole.

5.2.1 - Analysis of Perception of Collaboration by Sector
For both mandated and non-mandated partners, there was a greater difference in
perception of collaboration between the private and nonprofit sectors, followed by the next
largest difference between the private and public sectors, and the lowest difference between the
public and nonprofit sectors. This result is important in understanding which sectors have
similar and dissimilar perceptions of collaboration in the partnership. Surprisingly, the private
and nonprofit sectors showed the greatest difference in their perception of collaboration
compared to the difference between the private and public sectors. The surprise emerges because
typically the public and private sectors are seen as the most culturally dissimilar, particularly as
more nonprofits are starting to generate revenue and are commonly associated with associations
that support private sector causes. The public and nonprofit sectors had the most similar
perception, something that can be attributed to the similarity between their mission-oriented
goals and services, particularly as contrasted with the private sector.
When it came to the nature of the partnership, the nonprofit and public sectors had a
stronger perception of collaboration in the case of non-mandated partners while the private sector
had a stronger perception of collaboration for mandated partners. The private sector had the
strongest perception of collaboration amongst mandated partners. This may be because of the
belief that the partnership will not be successful if the survey respondent (private sector) does not
participate in the partnership. In WIOA mandates, the law requires that 51% of the board must
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be from the private sector, yet, the law does not state which members of the private sector must
participate. Therefore, this leaves the private sector participation individually by organization to
be voluntary. For this reason, there may be more transition of board members and overall
representation from the same private sector companies as it is more common for companies in
the private sector to start-up, close or relocate to other states.
On the other hand, the public sector is not run by the market, has finite organizations for
certain public services and typically has little choice whether they are mandated to be a part of
WIOA partnerships. Because of this, specific public sector organizations may have more
longevity in the partnership, yet, less flexibility for exiting the partnership.

5.2.2 - Analysis of the Perception of Collaboration by Components
While certain mandated partners may serve on a board longer, they may not necessarily
have more trust in the partnership or its partners, whether mandated or not. It may be that
mandated partnerships have displaced trust-based partnerships considering that “Trust” most
highly correlated with collaboration components, “Partnership Capacity,” and “Partnership
Responsiveness,” and those were the two components where there was the most agreement. The
two components, “Partnership Legitimacy,” and “Partnership Momentum” where there was the
least agreement, had the least correlation to “Trust.” These results suggest that higher trust does
lead to a stronger perception of collaboration.
It is interesting that “Trust” was least correlated to the components, “Partnership
Legitimacy,” and “Partnership Momentum.” Legitimacy describes the past, or collaboration
history/reputation and momentum describes the future, which would include partner’s future
actions. Graddy & Ferris (2007) suggest that organizations will prefer partners with who they
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have ties and social network connections. The private sector had the weakest perception of
collaboration for “Partnership Legitimacy,” for both the mandated and non-mandated partners.
This may be because the private sector is less like the public and nonprofit sectors and may have
had less ties and social connections prior to joining a partnership that mandated a 51%
participation from the private sector.

5.2.2.1 - Partnership Legitimacy
“Partnership Legitimacy” was the only collaboration component where mandated
partners had a stronger perception as compared to non-mandated ones. The component
“Partnership Legitimacy” consisted of two variables: (1) Collaborative group seen as a
legitimate leader in the community; and (2) History of collaboration or cooperation in the
community. This result could be contributed to the fact that mandated partner organizations
would be, by nature, less transient for their participation on the board as described earlier and
may know the history of collaboration in the community better. Mandated partners may also
perceive that the collaborative group is seen as a legitimate leader in the community because
they are required to participate and therefore, would most likely not see themselves as
illegitimate to the partnership.

5.2.2.2 - Partnership Momentum
The collaboration component that had the most difference among survey respondents was
for “Partnership Momentum” for the non-mandated partners from the private, public and
nonprofit sectors. “Partnership Momentum” was created through principal components analysis
from the following collaboration variables: (1) Favorable political and social climate; (2)
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Members see collaboration as being in their self-interest; and (3) Sufficient funds, staff, materials
and time. For the mandated partners, the greatest difference was between the private and
nonprofit sectors and for the non-mandated partners there was a statistically significant
difference between the private sector and the public and nonprofit sectors. Of all the components,
“Partnership Momentum” had the largest difference for both the mandated and non-mandated
partner groups. This finding is significant in that the momentum of the partnership would have
an effect on transaction costs, and the overall success of the partnership.

5.3 - Implications of the Study
The results of this study affect research and scholarship and professional practices in the
public policy and administration fields. These professional practices are mainstream among
professional organizations involved in cross-sector partnerships. The results of this study give
insights into these domains and are grouped accordingly in the two sections below.

5.3.1 - Implications for Research and Scholarship
In summary, the results of this study revealed interesting outcomes in addition to the
expectations of the existing body of literature. First, this study added to the literature by
examining collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners, including a focus on
sectors that are often at odds with one another. Contrary to the literature, mandated partners had
a slightly stronger perception of collaboration than non-mandated ones, something that was
traced to the sectoral origins of the partners. This underscored the importance of analyzing
partnerships by sectors rather than as an aggregate and that, clearly, trust is a complex variable.

93

Second, this study contributed to the collaboration and trust literature by examining the
connections between collaboration by dissecting collaboration into components in partnerships
that are not voluntary. All four components: (1) “Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership
Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy;” and (4) “Partnership Momentum” were
perceived differently in cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners and,
except for, “Partnership Legitimacy,” (a variable representing the collaborative past) nonmandated partners perceived collaboration more strongly.
While mandated partners had slightly more collaboration overall, the study revealed areas
where collaboration differed by sector and even by sector within different collaboration
components. In this sense, the study supported the current literature and confirmed the role of
trust and its importance as it relates to transaction costs. But it also showed how other
collaboration components can play a significant role, helping to weed out potential tendencies to
satisfy government regulations and motivations driven by monetary awards and the desire for a
positive public image.
Additionally, the study results have implications on a broader level for the governance of
mandated partnerships and how effectively they are working. It is important to consider if the
partnership model makes optimal use of transactions to achieve program benefits and reduce
costs. There are policy implications for the appropriate amount of government intervention and
regulation in regard to the equity of membership in mandated partnerships. Federal legislation
has requirements for WDBs that dictate who must participate and, for example, 51% of partner
participation must be from the private sector. Because of these specific guidelines, there may be
organizations that do not have equal access to join these workforce partnerships and may have a
harder barrier to entry.

94

In summary, the results extend the literature by introducing two broad considerations: (a)
sectoral origin or allegiance of partners and (b) whether partners were mandated to participate.
As well, by dissecting collaboration into constituent parts, the study advances the literature by
showing how capacity, responsiveness, legitimacy and momentum affect collaboration in
partnerships

5.3.2 – Implications for Public Policy and Administration
This study contributes to knowledge in the field by serving as a guide to policy makers
and practitioners on the importance of the perception of collaboration and its potential impact on
transaction costs for partnerships that require partners to join without free will. Policy makers
and practitioners can use this study to help evaluate overall cross-sector partnership collaboration
and capacity. Cross-sector collaboration, now more than ever, will be critical to solving policy
public problems, even crises. As our society advances, so does our reliance on technology. Trust
becomes particularly important for this reason as transaction costs, such as monitoring
partnership actions, may have to rely on more trust-based assessments. Using economic theory,
such as TCE theory, and applying it to a partnership’s performance is typically missing in
performance evaluation. Taking into account the importance of trust and governance structure
will enhance the evaluation of partnership performance and provide insight to any necessary
partnership restructuring. Public policy practitioners can evaluate collaboration strategies beyond
just a cost-benefit analysis to incorporate transition costs to increase the success of cross-sector
partnerships.
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5.4 - Recommendations for Future Research
Additional research could be done with a mixed-method approach, including both
quantitative and qualitative data collection to gain a better understanding of the extent of
collaboration differences by sector. A mixed-method methodology would further explain why
some sectors reported such differences for the mandated partner group versus the non-mandated
partner group. This approach could shed light, for instance, on reasons why survey respondents
may have answered survey questions in a certain way and identify where there was extreme
agreement or disagreement so that the perception of collaboration could be further explored. This
study could be replicated in other states, which may have slightly different state requirements for
mandated partners for WIOA partnerships and would include other regulatory and environmental
constants. Additionally, another study could focus more specifically on the individual WDBs in
Virginia by reporting more information by partnership level as opposed to just the state
aggregate. Finally, a study with a random sample of the over 600 WIOA boards across the
country would allow for more data and generalized conclusions on a larger scale.
The data in this study was collected with an online survey format and the response rate
was 27.7%. Research that attempts to collect data in person, for example, at a board meeting,
could result in a higher response rate. This approach may encourage more survey responses and
overcome the possibility that the survey respondents that elected to participate in the study may
have been more involved in the partnership than other peers that did not elect to participate in the
study. Finally, this study was cross sectional, yet it studied phenomena (collaboration, trust) that
evolve and change over time; therefore, a longitudinal study is recommended for a future study.
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5.5 - Conclusion
This study has significant implications for the governance of mandated cross-sector
partnerships that have both mandated and non-mandated partners. This particularly applies to
WIOA partnerships that mandate the makeup of partners in regional workforce boards across the
country. The findings of this study are consistent with the literature on the importance of trust
and collaboration, yet, this study also introduces the nuances of the complex nature of crosssector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners and the differences in the
perception of collaboration that result from them. These differing perceptions of collaboration
can affect transaction costs, and therefore, the success of the partnership.
Overall, the results of the study confirm some aspects of the literature, particularly the
salience of trust in reducing transaction costs and furthering collaboration. At the same time, the
results extend the literature by introducing two broad considerations: (a) sectoral origin or
allegiance of partners and (b) whether partners were mandated to participate. As well, by
dissecting collaboration into constituent parts, the study advances the literature by showing how
capacity, responsiveness, legitimacy and momentum affect collaboration in partnerships. In
addition, this study contributes to knowledge in the field by serving as a guide to policy makers
and practitioners on the importance of the perception of collaboration and its potential impact on
transaction costs for partnerships that require partners to join without free will. Solving complex
public policy demands, such as ensuring a highly skilled workforce, will require collaboration
from all sectors and in the most effective way possible. Policy makers and practitioners can use
this study to evaluate collaboration strategies that increase the success of cross-sector
partnerships.
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APPENDIX A

VIRGINIA BOARD OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Policy Area: Local and Regional Governance
Title of Policy: Establishment and Membership of Local Workforce
Development Boards

Number: 200-02 (2016)
Review by Date: July 1,
2018
Approved by:

Effective Date: July 1, 2016
Approved Date: June 23, 2016

Mark Herzog

Revision Date: July 1, 2016 (Rescinds and replaces current Policy 15-01)

I.

Purpose

This policy provides guidance for the establishment and membership of Local Workforce
Development Boards under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).
II.

Summary

Each local workforce development area designated in the Commonwealth shall establish
and maintain a Local Workforce Development Board (Local Board). Chief Local Elected
Officials (CLEOs) appoint the Local Board, which is certified every two years by the
Governor.
The Local Board is part of a statewide workforce system which is business-driven,
customer- centric, streamlined, and outcome-oriented. The Local Board shall carry out
strategies and policies that support both the economic development mission(s) for the
local area and the Virginia Board of Workforce Development’s (VBWD) goals. The
Local Board sets policy for the local area, in compliance with broader state policy, and is
the regional strategic convener, or acts in partnership with a designated regional
convener, in addressing workforce development issues, including but not limited to
WIOA activities.
The Local Board shall be led by committed business leaders who can ensure that the local
workforce system is responsive to current and projected labor market demand, shall
contain a broad range of partners needed to develop a comprehensive vision for the local
workforce system, and shall focus on strategic decisions, not operational management.
The Local Board has responsibility for making the following critical decisions:
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III.

References





III.

How best to organize the regional workforce system to most effectively serve the
needs of current and emerging private sector employers and job seekers;
How best to provide comprehensive services to regional private sector employers.
How best to deploy available resources to achieve negotiated local performance
accountability measures and build capacity for continuous improvement; and
How to expand the resource base and service capability through the development of
strategic partnerships, an integrated service delivery system, and generation of
additional public and private funding.

Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (Pub. L. 113-128)
Training and Employment Notice No. 05-14, Workforce Innovation and Opportunity
Act Announcement and Initial Informational Resources
Training and Guidance Letter No. 19-14, Vision for the Workforce System and Initial
Implementation of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Docket No. ETA-2015-0001, RIN: 1205AB73: Subpart C

Policy

Chief local elected officials shall submit annually to the Virginia Board of Workforce
Development updated Local Board membership information including contact
information for the Local Board, the annual budget for the Local Board and one-stop
operations, and other expenditures. The term “chief local elected official” means the chief
elected executive officer of a unit of general local government in a local area or an
elected official so designated by the chief local elected official.
A complete list of mandatory and optional Local Workforce Development Board
members can be found in Section 107(b) of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity
Act. There is no limit to the number of members the Local Board may have, but it must
include all mandatory members.
Mandatory Members




At least 51% of the members shall be composed of local private sector representatives
that represent a broad range of in-demand occupations available in the local labor
market. This includes organizations representing businesses that provide employment
opportunities that, at a minimum, include high-quality, work relevant training and
development in in-demand industry sectors or occupations in the local area.
Not less than 20%, a minimum of two, of the members of the Local Board, shall be
representatives of labor organizations, who have been nominated by local labor
federations, and representatives from apprenticeship programs. Community-based
organizations that have demonstrated experience and expertise in addressing the
employment needs of individuals with barriers to employment, including veterans,
persons with disabilities, and “out of school” youth may be included in addition to the
aforementioned labor organization representatives.

112











At least one representative from the Virginia Employment Commission who
administers WIOA Title III activities for the local area who shall be designated by the
Virginia Employment Commission.
At least one regional adult education program manager that directly administers
WIOA Title II Adult Education and Family Literacy (AEFLA) activities locally. If
there is more than one adult education program operating in the LWDB area and each
regional program manager is not represented on the board, it is recommended that
regional adult education program managers serve alternating terms.
At least one representative of a school division Career and Technical Education
program which represents programs aligned with the region’s targeted industry
sectors and demand occupations
At least one representative from a local community college providing training
services who shall be designated by the community college. At least one
representative from a regional or local economic and community development entity.
At least one representative from the Department of Aging and Rehabilitative Services
and/or the Department for the Blind and Visually Impaired who administers WIOA
Title IV activities for the local area who shall be designated by the two agencies
administering vocational rehabilitative services under Title IV of the WIOA

Optional Members















A representative from a regional planning entity.
A representative of eligible providers administering WIOA Title I Adult and
Dislocated Workers Employment and Training activities.
A representative of eligible providers administering WIOA Title I Youth Workforce
Investment activities.
A representative of eligible providers administering the Social Security Act Title IV
(Part activities.
A representative of eligible providers administering employment and training
activities carried out through the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’
Community Services Block Grant.
A representative of eligible providers administering employment and training
activities carried out through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Community Development Block Grant.
A representative of eligible providers administering Title V of the Older Americans
Act programs for engaging low-income senior citizens in community service,
employment, and volunteer opportunities.
A representative of eligible providers administering Section 212 of the Second
Chance Act offender reintegration activities.
A representative of eligible providers administering Supplemental Nutrient
Assistance Program Employment and Training activities.
A representative of eligible providers administering Social Security Ticket to Work,
Disability Employment Initiative, and other self-sufficiency programs.
A representative of eligible providers administering Small Business Association
Employment and Training activities.
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A representative of an entity that administers programs serving the local area relating
to transportation, housing, and public assistance.
A superintendent, or designated representative, of a local public school system (other
than a representative from a local Career and Technical Education program).
A representative of higher education providing WIOA activities.
A representative of a philanthropic organization.
Any other individual or representative of an entity as the chief elected officials in the
local area may determine to be appropriate.

Chairperson
The members of the Local Board shall elect a chairperson from among the private sector
representatives. The chairperson shall serve as the Executive Committee Chair and shall
identify the method for selecting the chairs for all standing committees and taskforces of
the local Board.
Membership Terms








Members of the Local Board must be individuals with optimum policy-making
authority within the organizations, agencies, or entities they represent.
Members of the Local Board shall be appointed for staggered terms.
Private sector representatives shall be an appropriate mix of small, medium and large
employers that reflect the local labor market, i.e., the business representation shall
reflect the industry mix in the local labor market.
Individuals serving on the Local Board who subsequently retire or no longer hold the
position that made them eligible board members may continue to serve on the local
Board; however, if their membership category changes as result of their retirement or
change in employment status, the local board must account for that change when
evaluating overall membership composition.
Vacancies resulting from resignations or removal of mandatory members must be
filled within 90 days.

Conflict of Interest
All members of the Local Board serve a public interest and trust role and have a clear
obligation to conduct all affairs in a manner consistent with this concept. All decisions of
the Local Board are to be based on promoting the best interest of the state and the public
good.
Accordingly:



All members of the Local Board are subject to the provisions of the State and Local
Government Conflict of Interest Act.
The Local Board shall adopt in its bylaws a conflict of interest policy meeting the
minimum standards set forth in the State and Local Government Conflict of Interest
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Act. The conflict of interest standards shall apply to all board members (voting and
non‐ voting).
A member of a Local Board shall neither cast a vote on, nor participate in, any
decision‐ making capacity on the provision of services by such member (or by an
organization that such member directly represents); nor on any matter that would
provide any direct benefit to such member or the immediate family of such member.
Immediate family means (1) a spouse and (2) any other person residing in the same
household as the member, who is a dependent of the member or of whom the member
is a dependent. Dependent means any person, whether or not related by blood or
marriage, which receives from the member, or provides to the member, more than
one‐half of his financial support.
Any Local Board member (or specific entity represented by that member) who
participates in the development of contract specifications or standards is prohibited
from receiving any direct financial benefit from any resulting contract.
Any Local Board member who participates in a Local Board decision relating to
specific terms of a contract, the determination of specific standards for performance
of a contract, the development of Invitations for Bid or Requests for Proposals or
other such bid processes leading to a contract, or any similar decisions is prohibited
from receiving any direct financial benefit from any resulting contract. In addition, no
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise, association,
trust, foundation or other entity shall receive the contract if it would create a conflict
of interest for the Board member who participated in this manner.
Each Local Board member shall file a statement of economic interest with the Local
Board as a condition of assuming membership and then annually while serving as a
Board member. The Chief Local Elected Officials shall determine the composition of
the statement of economic interest.
Any Local Board member with a potential or actual conflict of interest shall disclose
that fact to the Local Board as soon as the potential conflict is discovered and, to the
extent possible, before the agenda for the meeting involving the matter at issue is
prepared. If it is determined during a meeting that a conflict of interest exists, the
member must verbally declare such conflict of interest, such declaration must be
clearly noted in the minutes, and such member must excuse himself from the
remainder of the discussion and voting on that item. Each Local Board member is
responsible for determining whether any potential or actual conflict of interest exists
or arises during his tenure on the Local Board.
If a contract or purchase is made by the Local Board involving its own member with a
conflict of interest, the Local Board shall justify the terms and conditions of the
contract or purchase and document that the contract or purchase was adequately bid
or negotiated and that the terms of the contract or price of the purchase are fair and
reasonable.
Local Board members who are also one-stop center operators shall not serve on any
committees that deal with oversight of the one-stop system or allocation of resources
that would potentially be allocated to that member’s program.

115



V.

All members of the Local Board are subject to all other provisions of the State and
Local Government Conflict of Interest Act not outlined above.

Procedures

Local Board Appointment Process
Nominations and Selection
The Chief Local Elected Officials shall contact the appropriate entities in the local area
for nominations to appoint members and/or to fill vacancies on the Local Board from
business, local educational entities, and labor representatives. Chief Local Elected
Officials may also design a process for nominations of individuals and other types of
representation the officials would like to include on the Local Board. Vacancies
subsequent to the establishment of the Local Board must be filled in the same manner as
the original appointments.
Private sector representatives are to be selected from individuals nominated by local
business organizations (ex. business trade associations, chamber of commerce, economic
development agencies). Individual businesses may also nominate themselves or provide
nominations of other businesses to the chief local elected officials. Private sector
representatives can include owners of businesses, chief executives or operating officers of
businesses, and other business executives with optimum policy making or hiring
authority (ex. Vice Presidents of Human Resources).
Non-mandatory educational entity representatives must be selected from among
individuals nominated by regional or local educational agencies, institutions, or
organizations representing such local educational entities including local school boards,
entities providing vocational education, and postsecondary educational institutions. Labor
representatives must be selected from among individuals nominated by local labor
federations (or in a local area in which no employees are represented by such
organizations, other representatives of employees, such as employee organizations and/or
the state AFL‐CIO).
For all other members, Chief Local Elected Officials should consult with the appropriate
groups in the local area for possible individuals to serve including:




Representatives of community‐based organizations, including organizations
representing individuals with disabilities and veterans where such organizations exist
in the area.
Representatives of local economic development agencies, including private sector
economic development entities.
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Public Participation
Chief Local Elected Officials must provide public notice of the intent to solicit
nominations for Local Board membership, including the process to be used for
nominations and selection.
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APPENDIX B

VIRGINIA COLLABORATION SURVEY

This survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes to complete. Be sure to answer all questions. There
are no right or wrong answers.
Your identification is anonymous. Survey results will be kept confidential and will not be reported
individually. Results of the survey will be reported aggregately for individual Workforce Development
Boards and in total for all Workforce Development Boards in Virginia. Data from demographic questions
about organization sector, time served on the board, and whether or not you are required to be on the
board will only be reported collectively for all Workforce Development Boards in Virginia.
After the demographic questions, please select the best answer for each survey item. The words
"collaboration," "collaborative group," and "collaborative project" are referring to your Workforce
Development Board and the work that is being done by that Workforce Development Board only. Please
respond to each item as you view the overall Workforce Development Board partnership. If you are not a
member of a Workforce Development Board in Virginia, please do not fill out the survey.
Please ensure you hit 'submit' once you have completed the survey to record your answers. Thank you
for participating in this survey.

1.

Please name the Workforce Development Board that you are serving on.
_________________________

2.

How long have you served on this Workforce Development Board?
_____ 0-12 months
_____ 13-24 months
_____ 25-48 months
_____ 49+ months

3.

Please indicate whether the organization that you represent on the Workforce Development Board is
a private, public or a nonprofit sector organization.
_____ private sector organization
_____ public sector organization
_____ nonprofit sector organization

4.

Are you required to serve on this Workforce Development Board?
_____ Yes
_____ No
_____ I don’t know
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Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral, No
Opinion

Agree

Agencies in our community
have a history of working
together.
Trying to solve problems
through collaboration has
been common in this
community. It has been done
a lot before.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Leaders in this community
who are not part of our
collaborative group seem
hopeful about what we can
accomplish.
Others (in this community)
who are not a part of this
collaboration would
generally agree that the
organizations involved in this
collaborative project are the
“right” organizations to make
this work.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

The political and social
climate seems to be “right”
for starting a collaborative
project like this one.
10. The time is right for this
collaborative project.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

11. People involved in our
collaboration trust one
another.
12. I have a lot of respect for the
other people involved in this
collaboration

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

13. The people involved in our
collaboration represent a
cross section of those who
have a stake in what we are
trying to accomplish.
14. All the organizations that we
need to be members of this
collaborative group have

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Factor
History of collaboration
or cooperation in the
community

Statement
5.

6.

Collaborative group
seen as a legitimate
leader in the community

7.

8.

Favorable political and
social climate

Mutual respect,
understanding, and trust

Appropriate cross
section of members

9.

119

Strongly
Agree

become members of the
group.
Members see
collaboration as being in
their self- interest

15. My organization will benefit
from being involved in this
collaboration.

1

2

3

4

5

Ability to compromise

16. People involved in our
collaboration are willing to
compromise on important
aspects of our project.

1

2

3

4

5

17. The organizations that
belong to our collaborative
group invest the right
amount of time in our
collaborative efforts.
18. Everyone who is a member
of our collaborative group
wants this project to
succeed.
19. The level of commitment
among the collaboration
participants is high.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

20. When the collaborative
group makes major
decisions, there is always
enough time for members to
take information back to their
organizations to confer with
colleagues about what the
decision should be.
21. Each of the people who
participate in decisions in
this collaborative group can
speak for the entire
organization they represent,
not just a part.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

22. There is a lot of flexibility
when decisions are made;
people are open to
discussing different options.
23. People in this collaborative
group are open to different
approaches to how we can
do our work. They are willing
to consider different ways of
working.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Members share a stake
in both process and
outcome

Multiple layers of
participation

Flexibility
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Development of clear
roles and policy
guidelines

Adaptability to changing
conditions

Appropriate pace of
development

Evaluation and
continuous learning

Open and frequent
communication

24. People in this collaborative
group have a clear sense of
their roles and
responsibilities.
25. There is a clear process for
making decisions among the
partners in this collaboration.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

26. This collaboration is able to
adapt to changing
conditions, such as fewer
funds than expected,
changing political climate, or
change in leadership.
27. This group has the ability to
survive even if it had to
make major changes in its
plans or add some new
members in order to reach
its goals.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

28. This collaborative group has
been careful to take on the
right amount of work at the
right pace.
29. This group is currently able
to
keep up with the work
necessary to coordinate all
the people, organizations,
and activities related to this
collaborative project.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

30. A system exists to monitor
and report the activities
and/or services of our
collaboration.
31. We measure and report the
outcomes of our
collaboration.
32. Information about our
activities, services, and
outcomes is used by
members of the collaborative
group to improve our joint
work.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

33. People in this collaboration
communicate openly with
one another.
34. I am informed as often as I
should be about what is
going on in the collaboration.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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35. The people who lead this
collaborative group
communicate well with the
members.
Established informal
relationships and
communication links

Concrete, attainable
goals and objectives

Shared vision

Unique purpose

Sufficient funds, staff,
materials, and time

1

2

3

4

5

36. Communication among the
people in this collaborative
group happens both at
formal meetings and in
informal ways.
37. I personally have informal
conversations about the
project with others who are
involved in this collaborative
group.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

38. I have a clear understanding
of what our collaboration is
trying to accomplish.
39. People in our collaborative
group know and understand
our goals.
40. People in our collaborative
group have established
reasonable goals.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

41. The people in this
collaborative group are
dedicated to the idea that we
can make this project work.
42. My ideas about what we
want to accomplish with this
collaboration seem to be the
same as the ideas of others.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

43. What we are trying to
accomplish with our
collaborative project would
be difficult for any single
organization to accomplish
by itself.
44. No other organization in the
community is trying to do
exactly what we are trying to
do.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

45. Our collaborative group has
adequate funds to do what it
wants to accomplish.
46. Our collaborative group has
adequate “people power” to

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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do what it wants to
accomplish.
Skilled leadership

Engaged stakeholders

47. The people in leadership
positions for this
collaboration have good
skills for working with other
people and organizations.

1

2

3

4

5

48. Our collaborative group
engages other stakeholders,
outside the group, as much
as we should.

1

2

3

4

5
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APPENDIX C
IRB Approval Letter

TO:
CC:

Niraj Verma
Vanessa Rastberger
Niraj Verma

FROM: VCU IRB Panel A
Niraj Verma ; IRB HM20016721 What Happens When Cross-Sector
RE:
Partnerships are Mandated? Analyzing Trust through a Transaction Cost
Approach
On 8/6/2019 the referenced research study qualified for exemption according to 45
CFR 46 under exempt category/categories
Category 2(i) Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests,
survey or interview procedures, or observation of public behavior when the information
obtained is recorded in a manner that the identity of the subjects cannot readily be
ascertained
The information found in the electronic version of this study’s smart form and uploaded
documents now represents the currently approved study, documents, and HIPAA
pathway (if applicable). You may access this information by clicking the Study Number
above.
If you have any questions, please contact the Office of Research Subjects Protection
(ORSP) or the IRB reviewer(s) assigned to this study.
The reviewer(s) assigned to your study will be listed in the History tab and on the study
workspace. Click on their name to see their contact information.
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Attachment – Conditions of Approval for Exempt Studies

Conditions of Approval for Exempt Studies (version 1/21/2019)
In order to comply with federal regulations and the terms of this approval, the
investigator must (as applicable):
1. Conduct the research as described in and required by the IRB-approved
protocol/smartform.
2. Confirm that all non-VCU sites that have been approved to rely on the
VCU IRB for research requiring limited IRB review [45 CFR 46.104(d)(2)(iii),
(d)(3)(i)(C), (d)(7), or (d)(8))] are aware of and agree to abide by the reliance
relationship and the institutional responsibilities outlined in WPP XVII-6.
3. Submit amendments to the VCU IRB for review and approval before the
following types of changes are instituted at any site under the VCU IRB’s
oversight (VCU sites and non-VCU sites that rely on the VCU IRB):
o Change in Principal Investigator
o Addition or removal of non-VCU sites whenever one or more of the
following applies:
 VCU is the lead site in a multicenter study,
 A VCU investigator is overseeing study conduct and/or
directly, conducting research at another site, and/or
 De-identified or identifiable research data will be sent to a
different site
o Any change that poses new risks or increases the risks to
participants including, but not limited to, the following types of
changes:
 Changes in the study’s measures or the research
intervention, including
 Changes in behavioral intervention procedures or
the use of deception,
 Changes related to sexual activity, abuse, past or
present illicit drug use, illegal activities, other
sensitive topics, or other factors that might place
participants at risk of civil or criminal liability
 Changes reasonably expected to provoke
psychological distress or that could make
participants vulnerable, or
 Changes that relate to participants’ financial
standing, employability, educational advancement,
or reputation.
 Changes in the source of secondary information or
biospecimens
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Changes in the confidentiality or privacy protections used by
the study, including
 Changes in the storage location or method of
storage of research materials
 Changes in the identifiers being used to carry out
secondary research (regardless of whether
identifiers are retained in the research data).
 Changes related to the sharing of individual-level
research data
 Changes in recruitment strategy
 Changes in the planned compensation to participants
Changes that alter the category of exemption or that add
additional exemption categories
 Changes that add procedures or activities not covered by the
exempt category(ies) under which the study was originally
determined to be exempt
 Changes in the planned participant population (e.g. addition
of children, wards of the state, or prisoner participants,
students, control groups, etc.)
 Changes in the participant identifiers being used and/or
collected
 For studies currently approved under Pre-2018 Common
Rule Exempt Category 4: Change in inclusion dates for
retrospective record reviews if the new date is after the
original approval date for the exempt study. (Example: The
approval date for the study is 9/24/18 and the original
inclusion dates were 01/01/08-06/30/18. This could be
changed to 01/01/06 to 09/24/18 but not to end on 09/25/18
or later.)


o

Changes that do not meet these criteria do not have to be
submitted to the IRB. If there is a question about whether a
change must be sent to the IRB please call the ORSP for
clarification.
4. Provide non-English speaking participants with a written translation of the
approved consent information in language understandable to the research
participant. The IRB must approve the translated version prior to use.
5. Monitor all problems (anticipated and unanticipated) associated with risk to
research participants or others.
6. Report Unanticipated Problems (UPs), following the VCU IRB requirements
and timelines detailed in WPP VII-6
7. Respond promptly to all inquiries by the VCU IRB and Office of Research
Subjects Protection concerning the conduct of the research.
The VCU IRB operates under the regulatory authorities as described within:
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 U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services Title 45 CFR 46, Subparts A, B,
C, and D and related guidance documents.
 U.S. Food and Drug Administration Chapter I of Title 21 CFR 50 and 56 (for FDA
regulated research only) and related guidance documents.
 Commonwealth of Virginia Code of Virginia 32.1 Chapter 5.1 Human Research
(for all research).
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APPENDIX D

To: [Email]
Subject: Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Workforce Partnerships in Virginia
Dear [Name],
I am conducting research on collaboration and transaction costs in workforce cross-sector
partnerships and have selected to survey the Workforce Development Boards (WDB) in
Virginia. This research is for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Public
Policy and Administration at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). The overall scope of
this study is to examine collaboration and transaction costs in cross-sector partnerships. It has
been determined that, for example, as trust increases, transaction costs decrease, leading to better
collaboration and partnership performance.
I am requesting that you send a survey to your WDB members. You will find the survey attached
for your review only; the actual survey will be administered online. Your participation is
completely voluntary, and your response to this email will confirm your consent to distribute this
survey. You should not fill out the survey. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes to
complete and the name of the survey respondent will not be collected. Results of the study will
be used to better understand cross-sector partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs of
partnerships.
This study has been reviewed by the VCU Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Please respond back to me
via email affirming your consent to participate in the study. After doing so, I will send you an
email with a link to the online survey and specific instructions to send to your WDB members
only. The survey is intended for WDB members only, not Local Elected Officials (LEOs) that
are not appointed to the board or alternate, non-voting members of the board.
Please contact me directly if you have any questions about this study.
Thank you,
Vanessa H. Rastberger
(804) 402-4909
rastbergervh@vcu.edu
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APPENDIX E
Email: [Name]
Subject: Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Workforce Partnerships in Virginia
Dear [Name],
Please send the information below to your Workforce Development Board (WDB) members as
you previously agreed. You do not need to send this information to anyone outside of the board,
such as Local Elected Officials, unless they are on the board and a voting member of the board.
Thank you for your participation. I will reach back out to you in one week if I have not received
at least a 30% survey response rate. Please let me know when you have sent the survey so I can
track the timeframe that I can allow the survey to be open, which is three weeks from the initial
send. Thank you.
Vanessa H. Rastberger
(804) 402-4909
rastbergervh@vcu.edu
____________________________________________________________________________
Email Subject Line: Virginia Collaboration Survey and Study on Transaction Costs in Workforce
Partnerships
Dear [Name],
Vanessa H. Rastberger is conducting research on collaboration and transaction costs in
workforce cross-sector partnerships and has selected to survey the Workforce Development
Boards (WDB) in Virginia. This study is for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Public Policy and Administration at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU).
The overall scope of this study is to examine collaboration and transaction costs in cross-sector
partnerships. It has been determined that, for example, as trust increases, transaction costs
decrease, leading to better collaboration and partnership performance.
Please click on this https://redcap.vcu.edu/surveys/?s=C4JF9WMFPLto complete the survey by
September 12th, if possible. Please note the survey will close after three weeks. This survey can
be taken on a mobile device or iPad as long as you have an internet connection. Your
participation is completely voluntary, and by filling out the survey, you are consenting to
participate in the study. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes to complete. In the
interest of anonymity, you will not be asked your name, however, a few demographic questions
will be asked. This project has been reviewed by the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU)
Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that research projects involving human subjects
follow federal regulations. Results of the study will be used to better understand cross-sector
partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs of workforce partnerships.
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Please contact Ms. Rastberger directly if you have any questions about this study. She can be
reached at (804) 402-4909 and rastbergervh@vcu.edu.
Thank you,
WDB Executive Director
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APPENDIX F
Email: [Name]
Subject: Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Workforce Partnerships in Virginia
Dear [Name],
Thank you, [Name]. Per my research protocol, I am reaching out to you one week after the
survey was sent to let you know the response rate. I have received X% (X out of X) of responses
from your WDB members. If you are able, please resend the information below to the WDB
members. If there is anything that I can do to assist in getting a higher response rate, please let
me know. Thank you for your participation. I will reach back out to you one final time one week
from when you send the reminder to let you know how many responses I have gotten. I am able
to share this data with your WDB after the survey is over. Thank you.
Vanessa H. Rastberger
__________________________________________________________________________
Subject: WDB Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Virginia
Dear [Name],
This is a reminder and follow up email. Vanessa H. Rastberger is conducting research on
collaboration and transaction costs in workforce cross-sector partnerships and has selected to
survey the Workforce Development Boards (WDB) in Virginia. This study is for partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Public Policy and Administration at Virginia
Commonwealth University (VCU). The overall scope of this study is to examine collaboration
and transaction costs in cross-sector partnerships. It has been determined that, for example, as
trust increases, transaction costs decrease, leading to better collaboration and partnership
performance.
Please click on https://redcap.vcu.edu/surveys/?s=C4JF9WMFPL to complete the survey in the
next week, if possible. This can be done on a mobile device or iPad as long as you have an
internet connection. Your participation is completely voluntary, and by filling out the survey,
you are consenting to participate in the study. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes
to complete. In the interest of anonymity, you will not be asked your name, however, a few
demographic questions will be asked. This project has been reviewed by the Virginia
Commonwealth University (VCU) Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Results of the study will
be used to better understand cross-sector partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs for our
WDB and Virginia as a whole.
Please contact Ms. Rastberger directly if you have any questions about this study. She can be
reached at (804) 402-4909 and rastbergervh@vcu.edu
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Thank you,
WDB Executive Director
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APPENDIX G
Email: [Name]
Subject: Last Attempt for Virginia Survey of Workforce Board Members
Dear [Name],
This is my last attempt to collect survey responses from your board. I am following up with you
because I have only received a X% response rate (X out of X). However, there were X additional
responses after you sent the 1st reminder taking your response rate from X% to X%. Please
resend the information below to your WDB members. If there is anything that I can do to assist
in getting a higher response rate, please let me know. Thank you for your time and participation.
I will be back in touch with a final response rate and after I have done the data analysis. Lastly,
can you confirm that you sent the survey to X members or if there is a different number of board
members other than what your website reported.
Vanessa H. Rastberger
(804) 402-4909
rastbergervh@vcu.edu
____________________________________________________________________________
Subject: Last Chance - Virginia Survey with Workforce Board Members on Collaboration and
Transaction Costs
Dear [Name],
Vanessa H. Rastberger is conducting research on collaboration and transaction costs in
workforce cross-sector partnerships and has selected to survey the Workforce Development
Boards (WDB) in Virginia. This study is for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Public Policy and Administration at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU).
The overall scope of this study is to examine collaboration and transaction costs in cross-sector
partnerships. It has been determined that, for example, as trust increases, transaction costs
decrease, leading to better collaboration and partnership performance.
Please click here https://redcap.vcu.edu/surveys/?s=C4JF9WMFPL to complete this survey no
later than October 1st.Your participation is completely voluntary, and by filling out the survey,
you are consenting to participate in the study. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes
to complete. In the interest of anonymity, you will not be asked your name, however, a few
demographic questions will be asked. This project has been reviewed by the Virginia
Commonwealth University (VCU) Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Results of the study will
be used to better understand cross-sector partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs of
partnerships.
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Please contact Ms. Rastberger directly if you have any questions about this study. She can be
reached at (804) 402-4909 and rastbergervh@vcu.edu
Thank you,
WDB Executive Director
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APPENDIX H

Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings
Component Total
% of
Cumulative Total
%
Cumulative
Variance %
Variance %
1
10.861
49.367
49.367
10.861
49.367
49.367
2
1.292
5.872
55.239
1.292
5.872
55.239
3
1.167
5.306
60.546
1.167
5.306
60.546
4
1.082
4.920
65.466
1.082
4.920
65.466
Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis
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APPENDIX I
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APPENDIX J

Unrotated Factor Loadings Matrix
Variables

Factors
1
.837
.832
.821
.819
.819
.784

Shared Vision
Concrete, attainable objectives
Mutual respect, understanding, and trust
Open and frequent communication
Appropriate pace of development
Flexibility
Development of clear roles and policy
guidelines
.764
Evaluation and continuous learning
.760
Skilled Leadership
.758
Appropriate cross-section of members
.748
Members share a stake in both process
and outcomes
.745
Adaptability
.743
Engaged stakeholders
.695
Ability to compromise
.690
Unique purpose
.659
Established informal relationships and
communication links
.630
Favorable political and social climate
.570
Members see collaboration as in their
self-interest
.508
Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and
time
.461
Collaborative group seen as a legitimate
leader in the community
.533
History of collaboration or cooperation in
the community
.460
Multiple layers of participation
.593
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
a. 4 factors extracted
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2

3

4

-.403

.495
.482
.458
.558
.556
.648

APPENDIX K

Loadings for Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation

Skilled leadership
Adaptability to changing
conditions
Concrete, attainable goals and
objectives
Evaluation and continuous
learning
Shared Vision
Open and frequent
communication
Mutual respect, understanding,
and trust
Established informal
relationships and communication
links
Appropriate pace of development
Engaged stakeholders
Unique purpose
Development of clear roles and
policy guidelines
Members share a stake in both
process and outcome
Multiple layers of participation
Flexibility
Appropriate cross section of
members
Ability to compromise
Collaborative group seen as a
legitimate leader in the
community
History of collaboration or
cooperation in the community
Favorable political and social
climate
Members see collaboration as
being in their self-interest
Sufficient funds, staff, materials,
and time
Sum of squared loadings

Component 1:
“Partnership
Capacity”
.816
.780

Component 2:
“Partnership
Responsiveness”

Component 3:
“Partnership
Legitimacy”

Component 4:
“Partnership
Momentum”

Communality
.753
.692

.735

.405

.803

.726

.416

.726

.721
.687

.745
.749

.489

.644

.682

.637

.528

.605
.569
.539
.498

.418
.413
.449

.673
.528
.463
.638

.420

.476

.607

.528
.440

.847
.582
.563

.430

.497

6.37

2.41
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.784
.682
.613
.807

.517
.737

.749

.627

1.73

.713

.713

.709

.606

.524

.536

1.29

% explained variance

49.37%
5.87%
5.31%
Note: Factor loadings >.4 are in boldface (N = 126)
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4.92%
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International Relations from Randolph-Macon College in Ashland, Virginia. She received a
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Virginia. Her professional career has focused on workforce and education public policy while
working in the private, public and nonprofit sectors at the local, state and national level.
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